Background
The case concerned four siblings, aged between six and fourteen, whose father had admitted a pattern of domestic abuse during and after the parents’ marriage. In April 2026, the Family Court ordered that the children live with their mother but have limited, supervised in-person contact with their father. It prohibited routine telephone contact because the father had denigrated and undermined the mother during calls, causing the children emotional harm.
The judge declined to remove or substantially restrict the father’s parental responsibility, refused the mother’s applications for a prohibited steps order and a non-molestation order, and instead accepted detailed undertakings from the father. He also imposed a one-year restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 requiring either parent to obtain permission before making a further application concerning the children.
The mother appealed, challenging the procedure adopted under the Child Focused Court model, the decision to permit supervised contact despite the domestic-abuse history, the refusal of her other protective applications, and the section 91(14) restriction as applied to her.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only in relation to the section 91(14) order against the mother and dismissed every other ground. The trial judge had permissibly controlled the scope and duration of oral evidence and was not required to conduct a separate fact-finding hearing. Existing admissions and evidence supplied a sufficient basis for assessing welfare and risk, including the father’s continuing denigration of the mother during telephone contact.
The court held that the judge was entitled to reject the family court adviser’s recommendation and conclude that ending the children’s relationship with their father would be more emotionally harmful than allowing carefully limited, supervised contact. The judge had considered the admitted domestic abuse, the father’s limited insight, the children’s wishes, the risks of further harm, and the safeguards provided by supervision. Ending telephone contact was a proportionate response to the emotional harm caused through that medium.
The section 91(14) restriction against the mother could not stand because the judge had not analyzed whether her conduct justified such an order, and her conduct did not fall within the relevant statutory and procedural criteria. It was wrong to equate her litigation conduct or role in the family conflict with the father’s. The court otherwise upheld the refusal to curtail parental responsibility or grant the requested prohibited steps and non-molestation orders.
Key Takeaways
- The Child Focused Court model does not dilute the safeguards governing domestic-abuse cases; courts must continue to apply Practice Direction 12J rigorously and explain why any contact with a perpetrator is safe and beneficial for the child.
- A fact-finding hearing is required only when resolving disputed allegations is necessary to assess risk or determine the child’s future arrangements; judges may tightly control evidence to keep proceedings fair and proportionate.
- A section 91(14) restriction requires a conduct-based justification for each person against whom it is imposed and cannot automatically be applied symmetrically to both parents.
Why It Matters
As the first Court of Appeal decision addressing the Child Focused Court model, the judgment confirms that its investigative, problem-solving procedure operates alongside—not in place of—the established law on domestic abuse, procedural fairness, welfare analysis, and risk assessment.
The decision also illustrates the individualized balancing required in contact disputes: admitted abuse does not automatically preclude contact, but any continuing relationship must be evaluated through the abuse history and supported by safeguards capable of protecting both the children and the parent with whom they live.