Verity Healthcare v Cambridgeshire County Council — Court dismissed procurement challenge as filed out of time

Case
Verity Healthcare Limited v Cambridgeshire County Council
Court
High Court of Justice, Technology and Construction Court (United Kingdom)
Judge
Dame Alison Russell (Queen Elizabeth II, on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, 2014)
Date Decided
3 November 2026
Citation
[2026] EWHC 2830 (TCC)
Topics
Public procurement, Limitation, Summary judgment, Interim relief

Background

Cambridgeshire County Council conducted a competitive flexible procedure under the Procurement Act 2023 for a homecare framework worth an estimated £928.08 million, including VAT, over a term of up to 10 years. At the first-stage compliance gateway, prospective providers had to certify that they held a Care Quality Commission rating of “Good” or “Outstanding.” Verity Healthcare Limited, which was registered with the CQC but did not hold the required rating, alleged that this condition was disproportionate and therefore contrary to section 22 of the Act.

The tender notice was published on 15 July 2026. Verity accessed the procurement portal and registered its interest on 18 July, challenged the condition by letter dated 21 July, and issued proceedings on 17 August. It also sought urgent interim relief. The council applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing that Verity had missed the 30-day deadline in section 106(2). Verity maintained that it did not appreciate the relevant condition until 19 July and alternatively sought an extension of time, although it made no formal application for one.

The Court’s Holding

Mrs Justice Jefford entered summary judgment for the council because the claim was issued out of time. The court found that Verity had actual knowledge of the procurement by 18 July at the latest and probably learned of the CQC condition that day when its director accessed the portal. The claimant’s numerous witness statements gave inconsistent and incomplete accounts of when the company and its director acquired knowledge, permitting the court to draw an adverse inference.

Independently, applying the reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer standard, Verity ought to have known of both the procurement and the condition when the tender notice was published on 15 July. A contracting authority was not required to notify incumbent suppliers that it was using a different portal; a diligent supplier could monitor Find a Tender or other alerts and promptly review the linked documents. Even allowing a short period to review those documents, the claim remained late.

The court held that no extension issue properly arose because Verity had not sought one in its claim form or by application. In any event, it would have refused an extension: Verity identified its substantive complaint by 21 July but offered no good reason why it could not issue within the statutory period. The strength of the underlying proportionality case, the short delay, the council’s response time, and the procurement’s pre-award stage did not overcome the limitation bar.

Key Takeaways

  • The 30-day procurement limitation period may begin when tender information is published and accessible, not when a particular supplier actually reviews it.
  • A reasonably diligent supplier is expected to monitor public procurement notices and promptly examine linked tender documents; reliance on delayed third-party alerts does not postpone time.
  • Waiting for a contracting authority to answer a pre-action challenge does not by itself establish a good reason for extending the statutory deadline.

Why It Matters

This decision applies the Procurement Act 2023’s strict limitation regime to an early challenge against a condition of participation. Suppliers cannot rely on unfamiliar portals, internal monitoring arrangements, or the date on which a director personally appreciates a potential breach if the relevant materials were publicly available earlier.

The court also explained, although it was unnecessary to the disposition, that interim relief under section 102 requires a case-specific balancing of the public interest, suppliers’ interests, adequacy of damages, and other relevant considerations, with no statutory factor automatically taking priority. It would have refused relief because Verity showed only an arguable case, damages were adequate, and suspending the procurement would disrupt the council’s timetable and affect other bidders.

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