Background
In May 2021, a non-molestation order (NMO) was granted against Gary Wimblett by his former wife, prohibiting him from entering certain locations in Blackpool. When allegations arose in July 2021 suggesting Wimblett had breached the NMO, Lancashire PC Wade was assigned to investigate. After a telephone conversation in which PC Wade learned Wimblett had moved to Devon and the parties disputed whether an address was provided, PC Wade circulated a Police National Computer Nominal (PNCN) — a “Wanted Report with Power of Arrest” — on 16 August 2021 without any further contact with Wimblett.
On 11 September 2021, Wimblett attended Torquay Police Station and was arrested by PC Edmunds of the Devon and Cornwall Police, detained for approximately 16 hours, transported to Blackpool, interviewed, and released on bail. No further action was ultimately taken. Wimblett sued only the Chief Constable of Lancashire, arguing that PC Wade had directly procured his wrongful arrest by issuing the PNCN. The County Court at Preston (HHJ Beech) dismissed the claim as a preliminary issue, holding that a PNCN was not a direction to arrest and that, absent an allegation of lying or malice by PC Wade, there was no real prospect of establishing procurement.
Wimblett appealed to the High Court, arguing that the judge had failed to apply the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of accessory liability in Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed [2024] UKSC 17, which had not been cited below. Mrs Justice Dias conducted a full review of the accessory liability authorities in the context of wrongful arrest.
The Court’s Holding
Mrs Justice Dias confirmed that the Lifestyle Equities framework governs accessory liability: the accessory must have (a) procured the primary tortious act or assisted in it pursuant to a common design, and (b) known (or turned a blind eye to) all essential facts making the act a tort. Because false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability, the only essential fact is the arrest itself; accordingly, a briefing officer who intends an arrest to occur satisfies the knowledge requirement without needing to know whether the arresting officer had a valid defence under section 24 of PACE.
On the critical question of procurement, the court drew a fundamental distinction between “direct order” cases — where the arresting officer is effectively deprived of independent discretion and acts as the ministerial agent of the directing officer — and “briefing/information” cases, where an independent discretion is preserved. A PNCN falls firmly in the latter category: it grants a power to arrest but does not mandate one, and the arresting officer retains an obligation to exercise independent judgment under PACE. In pure briefing/information cases, the court held that some degree of wilful culpability — typically dishonesty, deliberate lying, or turning a blind eye — is required before procurement is established, consistent with the approach endorsed in Karalis v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2023] EWHC 1496 (KB) and with Lifestyle‘s general insistence on knowledge of the wrongdoing.
While the court agreed with the legal framework applied by the judge below, it found she may have erred in dismissing the claim summarily without an evidential hearing. The court noted that the judge appeared to have proceeded solely on the basis that no allegation of lying or malice had been made, without examining whether Wimblett’s Particulars of Claim actually contained sufficient pleaded facts — beyond the mere issuance of the PNCN — that, taken at their highest, could amount to wilful culpability warranting a trial.
Key Takeaways
- Accessory liability for wrongful arrest now falls to be analysed through the Lifestyle Equities framework: procurement plus knowledge of the essential facts making the primary act tortious (here, simply the fact of arrest, given false imprisonment’s strict liability).
- A PNCN is a briefing/information instrument, not a direct order; it preserves the arresting officer’s independent discretion and cannot by itself constitute procurement of an arrest.
- In briefing/information cases, a claimant must plead and prove wilful culpability — such as dishonesty, deliberate lying, or blind-eye knowledge — on the part of the briefing officer before accessory liability for wrongful arrest can be established; innocent negligence or omission is insufficient.
- Where such culpability is adequately pleaded and a prima facie case is raised, an evidential hearing is required; the claim cannot be dismissed summarily on the basis that no explicit allegation of lying appears without scrutinising the full particulars.
- The court reconciled the apparently conflicting decisions in Alford v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire [2009] EWCA Civ 100 and Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Copeland [2014] EWCA Civ 1014 by categorising the former as a pure briefing case and the latter as a direct order case.
Why It Matters
This decision provides the first High Court analysis of how the Supreme Court’s 2024 Lifestyle Equities accessory liability framework applies to wrongful arrest claims. By requiring wilful culpability — not mere negligence or honest mistake — in briefing/information cases, the court sets a meaningful threshold that protects police officers who act in good faith from accessory liability for arrests they did not themselves effect. At the same time, it confirms that a claimant who properly pleads dishonesty or deliberate manipulation of the police process cannot be shut out without an evidential hearing, preventing summary dismissal of meritorious claims.
The ruling also has practical significance for any claimant who chooses to sue only the force that issued a wanted notice rather than the force that made the arrest — a litigation strategy that requires establishing procurement rather than the arresting officer’s own state of mind. The court’s taxonomy of “direct order” versus “briefing/information” cases, and the different burden of proof analysis applicable to each, will guide how future claims of this kind are both pleaded and tried.