Background
Estanislo Canal-Medina was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child after his wife (referred to as “Grandmother”) witnessed him standing between the legs of their three-year-old autistic granddaughter, Gwen, with his exposed penis in his hand. Before trial, the State filed notice under rule 404(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence of its intent to call Mary—a neighbor who alleged that Canal-Medina sexually abused her on multiple occasions when she was between the ages of approximately three and nine—to show Canal-Medina’s propensity to commit child molestation. The alleged prior conduct included Canal-Medina touching Mary’s breasts and rubbing his penis against her buttocks. Canal-Medina moved to exclude Mary’s testimony, arguing the prior incidents were not sufficiently similar to the charged conduct because the specific sexual acts differed and the victims’ ages were not adequately proven to be comparable.
During jury selection, trial counsel did not challenge Juror 14, whose daughter worked for Adult Probation and Parole. Juror 14 had reported his daughter’s view that convicted criminals are “the worst people on earth” and should be “taken out and shot,” and had said he personally found hearing about sexual abuse “very trying.” When asked if he would be satisfied having a juror with his frame of mind, Juror 14 initially answered “no”—but then elaborated that he believed in the presumption of innocence and thought he could be fair. Trial counsel did not seek his removal. The jury convicted Canal-Medina, and he appealed on both the juror issue and the admission of Mary’s testimony.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed on both issues.
On ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court applied the two-step Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), framework and the additional jury-selection layer from State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, which presumes that a decision not to challenge a juror is a strategic choice. That presumption is rebutted only if a juror expressed bias “so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror.” The court reviewed not only the transcript but an audio recording of voir dire, which revealed that Juror 14 followed his problematic “no” with an audible chuckle—suggesting self-deprecating humor rather than genuine bias. Juror 14 had also explicitly disavowed his daughter’s views and affirmed his belief that a person is innocent until proven guilty. Given counsel’s privileged position to observe the juror’s demeanor, the decision to retain Juror 14 was plausibly justified.
On the rule 404(c) issue, the court held that the plain text of Utah R. Evid. 404(c)(2) is dispositive: “[I]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit . . . evidence that the defendant committed any other acts of child molestation to prove propensity to commit the crime charged.” The rule says “any other acts”—it imposes no similarity requirement. Canal-Medina’s reliance on State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, was misplaced: that the acts in Cuttler happened to be highly similar did not establish a floor of similarity for all cases. On the rule 403 balance, the court found no abuse of discretion: the evidence against Canal-Medina was strong independent of Mary’s testimony (eyewitness account, DNA matching, Canal-Medina’s inability to explain why his penis was exposed), and the jury received a limiting instruction that it could not convict solely because of the prior acts.
Key Takeaways
- Utah R. Evid. 404(c)(2) contains no similarity requirement for prior child molestation propensity evidence; the phrase “any other acts of child molestation” means what it says, and defendants cannot demand that prior incidents mirror the charged offense in terms of specific sex acts or victim age.
- Defense challenges to rule 404(c) evidence must focus on the rule 403 balancing test—arguing that probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice—because a similarity argument alone will not defeat admission.
- The Litherland presumption that counsel’s voir dire decisions are strategic is difficult to overcome; a juror who self-corrects after an ambiguous statement and affirms the presumption of innocence is not biased “so strong or unequivocal” as to trigger IAC liability.
- Appellate courts reviewing voir dire may consult audio recordings, not just transcripts, to assess whether a juror’s tone suggested humor rather than genuine bias—another reason cold-record IAC arguments face an uphill battle.
Why It Matters
State v. Canal-Medina is a significant ruling for Utah prosecutors handling child sexual abuse cases. By confirming that rule 404(c) has no similarity floor, the court gives the State substantial latitude to introduce prior molestation acts for propensity regardless of whether the specific type of conduct, victim age, or setting matches the charged offense precisely. Defense counsel seeking to exclude such evidence must concentrate their argument on the rule 403 prejudice-versus-probative-value balance, buttressed by the strength of the other evidence the State plans to present.
The voir dire holding highlights the importance of the audio record on appeal. The court reviewed an actual recording of Juror 14’s examination and found an audible chuckle that the written transcript could not convey. Appellate practitioners challenging jury selection decisions should consider whether the audio record supports or undermines the claim, since the court will consult it. More broadly, the decision reinforces that deference to trial counsel’s in-courtroom judgment calls—who can assess demeanor, tone, and body language that no transcript captures—is high and that reversal on IAC grounds for voir dire decisions requires a showing of strong and unequivocal juror bias, not merely ambiguous comments.