Background
Mother appealed from the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Family Division, No. 24-JV-00489, challenging termination of her parental rights to R.A., born in June 2023. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court also terminated father’s rights, finding that he had not meaningfully engaged in the case plan and that termination served R.A.’s best interests; father did not appeal. This three-justice panel’s decision is expressly not to be considered precedent before any tribunal.
The family court found the facts by clear and convincing evidence. Mother’s older child had previously entered Department for Children and Families (DCF) custody partly because of mother’s drug use. R.A. initially remained with mother, but mother relapsed on cocaine and fentanyl in February 2024 and reported that father destroyed her apartment while she and R.A. were inside. The State filed a CHINS petition in April 2024. Mother stipulated in June 2024 that her substance use placed R.A. at risk. The disposition order sought reunification with either parent and required mother to address sobriety, treatment, mental health, relapse prevention, parenting education, appointments, housing-related stability, safe boundaries, and engagement with DCF.
R.A. lived with foster parents from March 2024 and became well adjusted to their home, where her needs were met and they were prepared to adopt her. Mother attended weekly supervised visits but did not progress toward increased contact or custody. She missed R.A.’s medical and dental appointments, did not complete a mental-health assessment, and lacked demonstrated safe, stable housing. Although she had abstained from illicit drugs since November 2025, she continued using alcohol and marijuana and lacked a treatment provider or consistent relapse-prevention support. The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in December 2025, and the final hearing occurred in April and May 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The Court explained that termination after an initial disposition requires, first, changed circumstances under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b) and, second, a finding that termination serves the child’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114. Changed circumstances commonly arise when parental capacity stagnates or deteriorates. The most important best-interests consideration is whether the parent can resume parenting within a reasonable time. Appellate review upholds conclusions supported by the findings and affirms findings unless clearly erroneous.
The Court rejected mother’s argument that she was improperly evaluated together with father or blamed for his abuse. The family court had separately analyzed both parents, acknowledged mother’s respectful DCF engagement, weekly visits, emotional regulation through most of the case, and illicit-drug abstinence, but also identified her own unmet goals and continuing associations with unsafe individuals. Those associations were relevant to R.A.’s safety, not an attribution of father’s violence to mother. Credibility concerning mother’s testimony that her relationship with father had ended belonged to the trial court, and the Supreme Court declined to reexamine it.
Mother’s procedural-due-process argument also failed. She did not demonstrate preservation below or identify additional protections denied after receiving notice, a full evidentiary hearing, and appointed counsel. The Court distinguished Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rather than treating it as controlling: R.A. was not removed merely because mother suffered domestic abuse. Mother had stipulated that her illicit-drug use left R.A. without proper parental care, and termination rested on mother’s own conduct and resulting risks.
Finally, partial progress on illicit-drug use did not defeat the stagnation finding. Under In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994), some progress does not preclude changed circumstances. The supported findings included mother’s incomplete mental-health assessment, unstable housing, failure to expand visits or attend educational and medical appointments, lack of treatment and relapse-prevention engagement, and continued unsafe associations. Those findings supported both stagnation and the conclusion that mother could not resume parenting within a reasonable time from R.A.’s perspective.
Key Takeaways
- Termination requires changed circumstances followed by a statutory best-interests analysis, with timely resumption of parenting the most important factor.
- Progress in one area does not overcome supported findings of stagnation across other safety-related case-plan requirements.
- A parent’s continued association with unsafe people may be assessed as that parent’s own conduct without blaming the parent for another person’s abuse.
- The due-process claim was unsupported by demonstrated preservation or identification of procedural protections beyond those already provided.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates how Vermont’s family courts may credit meaningful parental improvement while still finding stagnation when other case-plan goals remain unmet and the child cannot safely be returned within a reasonable time. It also separates scrutiny of a parent’s own safety-related choices from improper punishment for being a domestic-violence victim.
The disposition is affirmance of mother’s termination order. Father’s separate termination was not before the Court because he did not appeal, and the panel’s non-precedent designation limits the order’s precedential use.