Background
Plaintiff Alexis Moore filed a complaint in Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, seeking an anti-stalking order against her neighbor, Amanda Fitzgerald. Moore alleged that Fitzgerald had assaulted her, followed her to retail stores and the post office, pounded on her door, screamed obscenities outside her window, and threatened to break her leg and beat her. The trial court denied emergency relief, finding the allegations insufficient to establish stalking under the statute.
After a final hearing in November 2025, at which Moore testified to a general “course of conduct” placing her in fear of bodily harm, the court found her testimony lacked specificity as to dates, times, and details. Fitzgerald moved for judgment at the close of plaintiff’s case, and the court granted it, finding Moore had not met her burden of showing that Fitzgerald made “true threats” or engaged in monitoring or following. Moore appealed, arguing the trial court applied an improper legal standard.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The sole legal question on appeal was whether the trial court erred by limiting the statutory term “threatens” — as used in the stalking statute’s definition of “course of conduct,” 12 V.S.A. § 5131(1)(A)(i) — to “true threats.” The court held that the trial court correctly applied that standard, relying on its prior decision in Hinkson v. Stevens, 2020 VT 69, which explained that because the stalking statute expressly excludes constitutionally protected activity, it is implicitly limited to true threats as defined under the First Amendment.
The court declined to address any challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court’s factual findings because Moore raised no such argument on appeal as required by V.R.A.P. 28(a)(3)-(4). To the extent her brief could be read to challenge the credibility findings, the court reiterated the settled rule that it will not second-guess a trial court’s credibility determinations on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Vermont’s anti-stalking statute, 12 V.S.A. § 5131(1), implicitly limits “threatening” conduct to “true threats” — statements communicating a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence — because the statute expressly excludes constitutionally protected activity.
- This “true threat” limitation is not an addition to the statute’s text but a constitutional constraint built into it by the exclusion of protected speech, as established in Hinkson v. Stevens, 2020 VT 69.
- Plaintiffs seeking anti-stalking orders must provide specific, detailed testimony (dates, times, circumstances); general assertions of a course of fearful conduct are insufficient to meet the preponderance-of-evidence burden.
- Appellate courts will not reweigh evidence or revisit credibility determinations made by a trial court, and issues not briefed on appeal are waived under V.R.A.P. 28(a)(3)-(4).
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the constitutional boundary built into Vermont’s civil stalking statute, confirming that courts must filter alleged threatening behavior through the First Amendment’s “true threat” doctrine before it can serve as a predicate act for a protective order. Attorneys seeking or opposing anti-stalking orders in Vermont should understand that heated, offensive, or even frightening speech does not automatically qualify as a statutory “threat” unless it rises to the level of a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence.
The case is an unpublished three-justice panel order with no precedential value, but it applies and reaffirms the precedential rule from Hinkson v. Stevens. It also serves as a practical reminder that vague, undated, or non-specific testimony — even if credible as a general matter — may fail to satisfy the burden of proof in civil stalking proceedings, underscoring the importance of thorough client preparation before any protective-order hearing.