Background
Cheryl O’Donnell and Hope Clough are neighbors in Bradford, Vermont whose relationship deteriorated into prolonged litigation over a right-of-way between their properties. In May 2023, O’Donnell filed a stalking complaint against Clough, and the superior court issued an anti-stalking order requiring Clough to stay away from O’Donnell and to remain at least fifty feet from the undisputed property boundary. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that original order in May 2024, and affirmed a first one-year extension in May 2025 after Clough was found clearing brush within the prohibited zone in violation of the order.
In September 2025, O’Donnell moved for a second extension, alleging that Clough again entered her lawn in July 2025, broke small trees, and declared “You get out of here. I own this land. I can do what I want,” prompting a police response. The superior court scheduled a hearing for October 2025, but continued it when Clough appeared remotely from a recent hospitalization. The court directed both parties to appear in person in November, then again in December 2025 after Clough submitted a doctor’s note citing a serious medical condition. Clough did not appear at the December 2, 2025 hearing and instead moved to dismiss the case, arguing that compelled participation endangered her life and renewing her challenges to the underlying property rulings.
The court proceeded in Clough’s absence, credited O’Donnell’s testimony about the July 2025 incident, found that Clough had been criminally charged with violating the stalking order, and concluded that the tensions underlying the original order persisted. It extended the anti-stalking order for a second additional year and denied Clough’s motion to dismiss. Clough appealed pro se — her third appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court in the matter.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed on all grounds. On due process, the court held that Clough received constitutionally adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard: she was sent notice of the December hearing, did not request a continuance (as she had done successfully twice before), and filed only a motion to dismiss rather than seeking postponement. The court drew on State v. Mott, 166 Vt. 188 (1997), to conclude that proceeding in an absent defendant’s absence does not violate due process where notice was given and no continuance was sought.
On the merits, the court rejected Clough’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, holding that O’Donnell’s first-hand testimony about Clough’s conduct was sufficient to support the factual findings and that credibility determinations belong to the trial court. The court also rejected Clough’s argument that the extension required proof of a new “course of conduct,” citing 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e), which expressly provides that a court extending an anti-stalking order need not find that the defendant stalked the plaintiff during the pendency of the order. Finally, the court held that Clough’s disagreement with the outcome of the property litigation did not excuse noncompliance with existing court orders.
The court also issued a pointed warning regarding a fabricated citation. Clough repeatedly cited “Hering v. Gurdak, 2014 VT 56” in her brief, but the docket number corresponded to a different opinion and the court could identify no Vermont Supreme Court decision by that name. Invoking V.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) and V.R.A.P. 25(d)(2)-(3), the court warned that future submission of fake authority could result in sanctions, noting that pro se litigants, while afforded some leeway, remain bound by the ordinary rules of procedure including Rule 11.
Key Takeaways
- Under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e), a Vermont court extending an anti-stalking order is not required to find that the defendant committed new stalking conduct during the pendency of the order — it need only find that extension is necessary to protect the plaintiff.
- A party who receives notice of a hearing and does not request a continuance — even if previously granted continuances for health reasons — is not denied due process when the court proceeds in her absence.
- Disagreement with an underlying civil judgment does not justify noncompliance with a related protective order; collateral attacks through violation of the order are not permitted.
- The court explicitly warned that citation to non-existent authority (“fake authority”) undermines the argument and the filer’s credibility, and that pro se litigants face potential Rule 11 sanctions for such conduct on future filings.
Why It Matters
The decision offers a clear restatement of Vermont’s anti-stalking extension standard: once a protective order is in place, courts have broad discretion to extend it based on the overall record without requiring proof of a fresh stalking campaign. This lowers the practical burden on plaintiffs seeking renewals in ongoing neighbor or domestic disputes and confirms that a defendant’s persistent legal challenges to underlying property or civil findings do not constitute a defense to a stalking order.
The court’s treatment of the fabricated citation carries independent significance. Although issued by a three-justice panel and therefore not precedential, the opinion is a public reminder — directed squarely at pro se litigants — that Vermont’s certification rules under V.R.C.P. 11 and V.R.A.P. 25 apply equally to represented and self-represented parties, and that submitting invented case citations can trigger sanctions. As AI-generated legal research becomes more accessible to non-lawyers, courts may increasingly confront and address this type of hallucinated authority.