Background
Vermont enacted Act 165 in 2021 requiring the Fish and Wildlife Board to adopt rules regulating coyote hunting with dogs, including a definition of “control” to minimize risks of trespassing, harm to people or animals, and property damage. The same year, Act 159 required the Board to adopt trapping rules with setback requirements for traps placed near public trails and other public areas. The Board proposed an amended rule requiring GPS collars on hunting dogs, establishing a 50-foot setback for traps from trails and highways with an exemption for traps set in water or ice, and defining “public trail” and “control” of dogs.
The Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules (LCAR) formally objected to three aspects of the proposed rule: the definition of “control,” the definition of “public trail,” and the exemption for water- or ice-based traps from setback requirements. LCAR asserted these provisions were inconsistent with legislative intent. The Board made minor revisions but declined to eliminate the water/ice exemption, and adopted the rule over LCAR’s objections. Plaintiffs—environmental and animal welfare nonprofits—sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the objected-to portions were invalid.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding the regulations, but reversed the trial court’s interpretation of the legal effect of LCAR’s objection. The Court held that when LCAR formally objects to a rule, 3 V.S.A. § 842(c)(2) shifts the burden to the agency to prove all seven statutory factors—not merely the ground on which LCAR objected. Those factors are: that the rule is within the agency’s delegated authority, consistent with legislative intent, not arbitrary, written in satisfactory style, issued with proper public input, and supported by economic and environmental impact analyses that did not fail to recognize substantial impacts.
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Board must meet this burden by clear and convincing evidence, holding that the ordinary civil standard of preponderance of the evidence applies unless the statute expressly requires a higher standard—which § 842(c) does not. The Court noted, however, that an LCAR objection removes the deference normally afforded agency interpretations of enabling statutes, requiring de novo review.
On the merits, the Court upheld all three disputed provisions. It construed “minimize” in Act 165 to mean “reduce to the least quantity possible that still reasonably allows hunting to occur,” not “reduce as much as possible,” thereby finding the GPS collar requirement a reasonable means of control consistent with legislative intent. The Court held the “public trail” definition reasonable and consistent with Act 159, and upheld the water/ice trap exemption as supported by the Board’s rationale that such traps pose low public risk and are necessary for trapping animals active near shorelines.
Key Takeaways
- LCAR objections to agency rules trigger burden-shifting on all statutory compliance factors listed in § 842(c)(2), not merely the ground asserted by LCAR.
- Agencies defending objected-to rules need not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard; preponderance of the evidence applies unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
- An LCAR objection removes Chevron-style deference to agency interpretation of enabling statutes; courts conduct independent de novo review of statutory language.
- Statutory terms like “minimize” must be read in context with the statute’s overall purpose; a requirement to “minimize risk” does not necessarily mean reduce risk to the absolute greatest extent feasible if doing so would frustrate the statute’s other objectives.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a critical procedural rule in Vermont’s administrative law: the full scope of burden-shifting triggered by LCAR objections and the evidentiary standard agencies must satisfy. For regulators, it establishes that LCAR objections will require affirmative proof across all statutory factors, but only by preponderance—a potentially manageable but still substantial burden. For challengers to agency rules, it means that after LCAR objects, plaintiffs retain the advantage that deference to agency interpretation is eliminated, but they must still overcome the agency’s burden on at least one factor to invalidate the rule.
The decision also offers guidance on statutory construction in the wildlife and natural-resources context: courts will read broad mandates like “minimize risk” as reasonable compromises that allow the regulated activity to continue, not as absolute prohibitions. This interpretive approach may have implications beyond coyote hunting for how courts construe similar management directives in environmental and resource regulations.