Background
Jeffrey Rivard filed suit in December 2024 against the Town of Brattleboro and various state and municipal employees after Brattleboro police issued two trespass orders against him — one barring him from his child’s school and one prohibiting him from the police department’s property. Each order notified recipients that they could appeal by calling the town manager within fourteen days. Rivard alleged he called to appeal but received no response, and brought Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims against the Town and its town manager for failing to respond to his appeals.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding Rivard failed to state a claim. With respect to the school trespass order, the court noted that the order itself designated the school as private property and stated that the appeal process applied only to public property — meaning no appeal to the town manager was available. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in November 2025, declining to address the school trespass claim because Rivard had not challenged it in his principal brief on that appeal. Rivard v. Town of Brattleboro, No. 25-AP-282, 2025 WL 3124895 (Nov. 7, 2025) (unpub. mem.).
In January 2026, Rivard filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), asserting newly discovered evidence that the officer who issued the school trespass order knew the school was public property but falsely marked it as private. He also alleged misrepresentation when he was told he faced a felony upon detention for violating the order when it was actually a misdemeanor, and claimed the trial court erred in its characterization of his allegations against certain defendants. He further moved for judicial notice of various facts and for leave to file a second amended complaint. The trial court denied all three motions, and Rivard appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed all three denials. On the Rule 60(b) motion, the court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment. Because Rivard himself had attached the trespass order — which listed the school as private property — to his own pleadings, any resulting “mistake” in the record was of his own making and did not constitute a judicial error warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(1). The court further held that Rivard failed to satisfy Rule 60(b)(2) because he did not explain why the newly discovered evidence could not have been obtained earlier through due diligence, and he did not demonstrate that defendants’ fraudulent conduct prevented him from correcting the record as required under Rule 60(b)(3).
The court also rejected Rivard’s challenge to the denial of leave to amend. Once a final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff no longer has a right to amend under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 15. To the extent Rivard challenged the trial court’s finding that he had engaged in vexatious litigation, the court found those arguments inadequately briefed and declined to disturb the ruling below.
The denial of Rivard’s motion for judicial notice was affirmed as moot in light of the court’s other rulings. The panel concluded that all remaining arguments lacked merit.
Key Takeaways
- A party cannot obtain Rule 60(b)(1) relief by characterizing as judicial “mistake” an error that the party itself introduced into the record through its own pleadings or attachments.
- To obtain relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), a movant must affirmatively explain why the evidence could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence — a conclusory assertion is insufficient.
- Once final judgment has entered, the right to amend a complaint under V.R.C.P. 15 is extinguished; amendment requires satisfying the higher bar for post-judgment relief rather than the more permissive pre-judgment amendment standard.
- This decision is unpublished and issued by a three-justice panel; it carries no precedential weight before any Vermont tribunal.
Why It Matters
The case reinforces the limited scope of post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b) in Vermont. Courts will closely scrutinize whether a movant’s claimed “newly discovered evidence” or “mistake” is truly new and truly judicial — or whether it is an attempt to relitigate factual and legal issues that the movant could have raised during the original proceedings. Plaintiffs who fail to develop a complete record before final judgment face a high bar to reopen the case.
The decision also illustrates the finality principles that govern civil litigation once a judgment becomes conclusive: the right to amend pleadings does not survive final judgment, and inadequately briefed challenges to trial court findings will be summarily rejected on appeal. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that errors in the evidentiary record must be addressed proactively, and that post-judgment motions are a narrow remedy, not a second opportunity to build a case.