Background
The Housing Foundation, Inc., which owns a mobile home park in Milton, Vermont, filed an eviction complaint in December 2025 against tenant Nicole Tourangeau, who rented lot space for her mobile home under a written lease requiring monthly payments of $436. The landlord alleged that Tourangeau failed to pay rent in October 2025. On November 7, 2025, the landlord notified her by certified mail that her tenancy would terminate by December 12, 2025, unless she paid her then-existing arrearage of $832.61. Tourangeau did not pay the full amount by that date and remained in possession of the lot. Significantly, she had previously defeated an earlier eviction action brought by the same landlord by paying the arrearage into court in May 2025.
The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division (Judge Megan J. Shafritz) held a hearing in April 2026 at which both parties appeared. Based on the evidence presented, the court awarded judgment of possession to the landlord and ordered Tourangeau to pay $1,268.61 in rent and $2,713.93 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court found that Tourangeau did not have the right to redeem the tenancy under 12 V.S.A. § 4773 because she had already defeated a prior nonpayment-of-rent eviction action under that statute within the preceding twelve months. Tourangeau appealed pro se.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. As a threshold matter, the Court addressed the scope of appellate review. Because the judgment followed a bench trial, factual findings would be upheld unless clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law were reviewed de novo, citing MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 2003 VT 70, ¶ 17, 175 Vt. 382. The Court noted that Tourangeau did not appear to challenge any factual findings, and even if she had, review would be impossible because she did not order a transcript of the final hearing, at which the trial court apparently made oral findings and conclusions. Under V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1), failing to order a transcript waives any issue for which a transcript is necessary, and under Evans v. Cote, 2014 VT 104, ¶ 7, 197 Vt. 523, the Court assumes the findings are supported by the evidence absent a transcript. The Court therefore limited its review to whether the law was correctly applied.
On the merits, the Court explained that 10 V.S.A. § 6237(a)(2) permits a mobile home park owner to evict a leaseholder for nonpayment of rent following notice by certified or registered mail, and that such evictions are governed by chapter 169 of Title 12. Under 12 V.S.A. § 4773, a defendant may ordinarily defeat an eviction action before the writ of possession is executed by paying into court all rent, interest, and court costs then due. However, the statute expressly provides that a defendant may not use this curative mechanism more than once in twelve months, with the twelve-month period beginning on the day payment is made. Because Tourangeau had previously defeated an eviction action in May 2025 by paying overdue rent and then fell behind again later that year, the landlord was entitled to bring a new eviction action, and Tourangeau no longer had the legal right to end it by paying what was owed. The Court found no error in the award of judgment to the landlord.
As to the attorney’s fees and costs award, the Court declined to address Tourangeau’s apparent challenge because she did not explain why the award should be reversed or cite any supporting authority, rendering the argument inadequately briefed under V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4) and In re Snyder Group, Inc., 2020 VT 15, ¶ 26 n.10, 212 Vt. 168. The Court noted, however, that section 15 of the lease entitled the landlord to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining possession, and that 12 V.S.A. § 4854 provides that a plaintiff found entitled to possession shall have judgment for possession, rents due, damages, and costs, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees if provided for in the lease.
Key Takeaways
- Under 12 V.S.A. § 4773, a tenant may defeat a nonpayment eviction action by paying all rent, interest, and costs into court — but only once in any twelve-month period, measured from the date of the prior payment.
- A tenant who redeemed a tenancy in May 2025 and again stopped paying rent later that year could not invoke § 4773 to defeat a second eviction action brought within the same twelve-month window.
- An appellant who fails to order a transcript of a hearing at which the trial court made oral findings waives any challenge requiring the transcript; the Supreme Court will assume the findings are supported by the evidence. V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1).
- Appellate arguments raised without explanation or citation of authority will not be addressed as inadequately briefed. V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4).
Why It Matters
This entry order reinforces the statutory one-per-twelve-months limit on a tenant’s right to cure nonpayment and defeat an eviction under 12 V.S.A. § 4773, a provision of particular importance in the mobile home park context, where lot tenants face displacement of their homes. Landlords and tenants alike should note that the twelve-month clock runs from the date the curative payment is made, not from the prior judgment.
The order also illustrates two recurring appellate pitfalls for pro se litigants: the waiver that flows from failing to order a hearing transcript under V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1), and the consequences of inadequately briefed arguments under V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4). As a decision of a three-justice panel, the order is not to be considered precedent before any tribunal.