Background
Mary Zigman and Chris Scotellaro, both employees at the Rutland County Parent Child Center, filed separate petitions in May 2024 seeking to be adjudicated as de facto parents of C.G., the minor child of Sarah Goodwin. The parties had consolidated their cases. Zigman and Scotellaro began caring for C.G. in late 2019 when Goodwin, who was a client at the Center, was in crisis due to substance use and needed emergency care for her infant son. Over the next several years, the petitioners provided substantial childcare while Goodwin struggled with substance abuse, domestic violence, and other crises. The parties referred to themselves as a “non-traditional family,” though Goodwin retained legal custody of C.G. The petitioners’ romantic relationship ended in February 2023, but they continued their involvement with the child. When Goodwin began denying them access to C.G. in spring 2024, they reported concerns to the Department for Children and Families and filed their de facto parentage petitions.
The trial court held evidentiary hearings over multiple days in 2024 and early 2025. In its December 2024 order, the trial court found that the petitioners met five of seven statutory factors for de facto parentage but failed on two critical factors: (C) undertaking full and permanent parental responsibilities, and (G) the continuation of the relationship being in the child’s best interests. On factor (C), the court found the petitioners’ responsibilities were “limited and conditional” because they always acted with Goodwin’s permission and in accordance with her instructions, and their primary motivation was to help stabilize Goodwin rather than to parent the child independently. On factor (G), the court concluded that while the petitioners had established a bonded relationship with the child, continuing that relationship was not in the child’s best interests, particularly because the petitioners held a position of authority over the mother through their work at the Center and failed to report their concerns to DCF as mandated reporters until after Goodwin cut off their contact.
Zigman’s original attorney withdrew, and replacement counsel moved for a new trial on factors (C) and (G), alleging ineffective assistance. The trial court granted the motion. At a June 2025 hearing, both petitioners presented additional evidence. The trial court again concluded that neither petitioner met the burden on factors (C) or (G) and denied both petitions. Zigman appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in full. The appellate court first addressed several procedural challenges raised by Zigman, who was self-represented on appeal. The court declined to consider several arguments because they were inadequately briefed under Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure, including challenges that the trial court erred in limiting the June 2025 hearing to factors (C) and (G) and consolidating Zigman’s petition with co-petitioner Scotellaro’s separate petition—both of which Zigman had herself requested in the trial court.
On the merits, the court applied the deferential clear-error standard to the trial court’s factual findings and reviewed the legal conclusions for reasonable support. Zigman had not challenged any specific factual findings as clearly erroneous; instead, she asked the appellate court to reweigh the evidence and revisit the trial court’s credibility determinations. The Vermont Supreme Court declined, reaffirming that credibility assessment and evidentiary weighing are the exclusive province of the trial court, which has the advantage of observing witness testimony firsthand. The court noted that the trial court had considered the expert testimony Zigman offered regarding the trauma to a child from disruption of a parental relationship but properly gave it limited weight because the expert had not met with or evaluated C.G. himself.
On factor (C), the court rejected Zigman’s argument that the trial court had imposed a requirement of “unconditional parental responsibility” beyond the statutory text. The statute requires proof that the person “undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child.” The trial court’s factual finding that Zigman’s responsibilities were “limited and conditional” reasonably supported the legal conclusion that she had not met this burden. The court emphasized that even if Zigman’s goal was to raise the child rather than to assist the mother, this would be irrelevant to whether she undertook full and permanent parental responsibilities.
On factor (G), the court noted that this factor requires a broader examination of the entire relationship between the person and the child—not merely whether a parental relationship is in the child’s best interest. The trial court properly considered the evidence regarding the mother’s mental health and the impact of disrupting the relationship but concluded that the petitioners had not carried their burden. The court was permitted to weigh the factors holistically, including the fact that clear boundaries between the parties’ relationship were never established and that the petitioners, despite being mandated reporters, had delayed reporting their concerns until after losing access to the child.
Key Takeaways
- De facto parentage requires proving all seven statutory factors by clear and convincing evidence; failure on even one factor is fatal to the petition.
- Caretaking responsibilities must be “full and permanent” to satisfy factor (C); conditioned or time-limited responsibilities, even if extensive, do not suffice.
- Factor (G) requires a holistic examination of the entire relationship between the person and child, including the circumstances under which the relationship developed and whether it truly serves the child’s interests.
- Appellate courts will not reweigh evidence or second-guess a trial court’s credibility determinations; self-represented litigants must comply with rules of appellate procedure and adequately brief their arguments.
- A person in a position of authority over a legal parent (such as through employment relationship) may face heightened scrutiny in de facto parentage proceedings, particularly if reporting obligations were not timely fulfilled.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Vermont’s demanding statutory framework for de facto parentage, which requires clear and convincing proof on multiple independent factors. Even lengthy and meaningful childcare relationships do not automatically confer parental status. The decision underscores that the quality and scope of legal parental responsibility—not merely the emotional bond or practical caregiving—is central to the inquiry. The court’s emphasis on the “limited and conditional” nature of Zigman’s responsibilities signals that de facto parentage is not a remedy for every non-traditional family arrangement, but rather a narrowly tailored recognition of established parent-like status.
The decision also highlights tensions inherent in cases involving multiple caregivers and vulnerable populations. Notably, the trial court and appellate court both found it significant that Zigman and Scotellaro, as employees of a family service agency, occupied a position of authority over Goodwin and may have influenced the relationship with her through that dynamic. The court’s concern that they did not report suspected abuse or neglect until after losing contact with the child suggests that de facto parentage petitions may receive closer scrutiny when the petitioners have professional or power-based relationships with the legal parent, and when their reporting obligations intersect with their personal interests in maintaining contact with the child.