Background
M.S. was paralyzed from the chest down in a 2007 car accident and required around-the-clock home care. Her son Brian held power of attorney and hired caregivers, including Ebony Jones. Although Brian managed most financial decisions, M.S. retained access to her bank account and typically consulted him before spending. By late 2022, M.S. developed age-related cognitive decline with intermittent memory issues.
Between July and November 2022, 127 unauthorized transfers totaling $57,348.61 were made from M.S.’s personal bank account to accounts held by Jones or her husband. When confronted, Jones initially denied knowledge of the transfers. Three months later, in an interview with police, she claimed M.S. had authorized her to use the account to pay credit card bills and that they had an undocumented loan agreement for upfront payment in exchange for future work—despite continuing to receive regular paychecks from a separate payroll account.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones’s conviction for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Code § 18.2-178.1(B), addressing the statute’s “through the use of” requirement for the first time. The court held that this language means taking advantage of or manipulating a vulnerable person’s impairment or its effects—not necessarily exploiting a specific physical characteristic to gain access. A caregiver who accesses a vulnerable adult’s finances by virtue of her employment relationship and the care recipient’s disability sufficiently exploits that impairment.
The court interpreted the 2022 legislative amendments as intentionally broadening protection for adults with various impairments affecting their ability to care for themselves, including caregivers who abuse their position of trust. Because M.S. required 24/7 care due to her paralysis, Jones only had access to M.S.’s home and finances because of that disability. The court found circumstantial evidence sufficient: caregivers were authorized to order medical supplies but not access banking information; M.S. had never granted Jones unrestricted account access; and when confronted, Jones initially denied knowledge before later offering an implausible explanation. Intent to permanently deprive was inferred from Jones’s initial denial, three-month delay in disclosure, inconsistent accounts, and continued regular paycheck receipt despite claiming an upfront-payment arrangement.
Key Takeaways
- Virginia’s financial exploitation statute does not require proof of a specific method or mechanism by which a defendant accessed a vulnerable adult’s accounts; exploiting one’s authorized position of trust suffices.
- The 2022 amendments expanded “vulnerable adult” status beyond strict incapacity to include those with conditions substantially impairing their ability to provide for daily needs or safeguard property—encompassing both M.S.’s paralysis and age-related cognitive decline.
- Caregiver abuse is a paradigmatic target of the statute; professional caregivers who exploit their access commit financial exploitation even without direct evidence showing exactly how they breached the victim’s accounts.
- Intent to permanently deprive is properly inferred from conduct and circumstances, including denial upon discovery, delay in offering explanation, and implausible post-hoc rationales.
Why It Matters
This decision provides the first appellate interpretation of the “through the use of” language in Virginia’s financial exploitation statute. By holding that exploitation need not involve using a specific disability characteristic to gain access—only that the defendant took advantage of the vulnerability and the relationship it created—the court significantly broadens prosecution possibilities. Prosecutors need not trace the precise method by which a caregiver or trusted person breached account security; rather, the caregiver’s position of trust, arising from the vulnerable adult’s dependency, can itself constitute the exploitation.
The ruling also reinforces the legislature’s 2022 intent to protect vulnerable populations from predatory conduct by those entrusted to their care. By permitting inference of intent from circumstantial evidence and rejecting Jones’s uncorroborated self-serving claims, the court signals that trial courts have substantial discretion to weigh credibility and that appellate review will defer to jury verdicts supported by any rational interpretation of the evidence.