Kelley v. Commonwealth — Virginia appeals court reverses shooting-from-vehicle conviction, vacates $22,796 restitution award, and affirms other convictions

Case
Robert Darrell Kelley v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Court
Court of Appeals of Virginia
Judge
Causey; Chaney; White
Date Decided
November 4, 2026
Docket No.
2064-24-2
Topics
Criminal law; sufficiency of evidence; restitution; jury polling
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

On October 17, 2023, Hanover County resident Leonard Short heard a gunshot and later found a hole in his mailbox. Neighbor David Hill heard three gunshots; the next morning, his granddaughter found her horse with head wounds. Bullet fragments had injured the horse’s skull and sinus cavity. The horse underwent three surgeries over six weeks and recovered. Searches of Kelley’s and co-defendant Jacob Brady’s homes and vehicles produced Kelley’s phone, geolocation data placing him near the properties, photographs of him holding the alleged rifle, matching shell casings, and the rifle and scope flashlight. Earlier that day, Kelley bought ammunition at Green Top Sporting Goods and drove away.

A jury convicted Kelley of attempted malicious wounding of a horse, malicious wounding of a horse, conspiracy to commit malicious wounding of a horse, animal cruelty, and shooting from a vehicle. The trial court sentenced him to 35 years and 12 months, suspending 32 years and 12 months. Blue Ridge Equine Clinic’s charges totaled $40,956, but it reduced the family’s obligation to $18,160, which the family paid. The owner’s stepfather also paid a separate $445 emergency-veterinary bill. The court ordered $18,605 paid to the stepfather and $22,796 to Blue Ridge, jointly and severally with Brady.

The Court’s Holding

Judge Causey’s published opinion reversed and dismissed the shooting-from-a-vehicle conviction. Although sufficiency review views the evidence favorably to the Commonwealth, statutory interpretation is de novo. Code § 18.2-286.1 requires that the shooter be in or on a motor vehicle and create risk or reasonable apprehension of injury or death to another person. The dark surveillance videos did not establish that Kelley or Brady was inside a vehicle; one included a closing car door. Nor did the evidence identify any natural person at risk. The mailbox and horse were property, not persons protected by that element.

The court affirmed the malicious-wounding conviction under Code § 18.2-144, together with the attempt and conspiracy convictions. The jury could infer intent from the scope light following the horse and a second shot fired while the horse was illuminated, and could reject Kelley’s accidental target-practice theory. The animal-cruelty conviction also remained affirmed: Kelley’s intent-based sufficiency argument was not preserved under Rule 5A:18 and, in any event, was barred by the approbate-reprobate doctrine after his contrary trial position.

The court vacated the $22,796 award to Blue Ridge and remanded for an amended restitution order. Reading Code §§ 19.2-11.01(B) and 19.2-305.1(B) together, it treated veterinary bills as evidence of damage to the owner’s property, not medical expenses incurred by a human victim. Unlike Commonwealth v. Puckett, no insurer or agency paid an obligation incurred by the owner; the provider contemporaneously reduced its own charges. The Commonwealth therefore failed to prove by a preponderance that the owner paid, owed, or lost $22,796. The $18,605 award remained undisturbed, and the court rejected a universal market-value cap, recognizing that reasonable, necessary veterinary expenses actually owed can exceed an animal’s market value.

Finally, Kelley waived his polling challenge by failing to object. The court declined Rule 5A:18’s narrow ends-of-justice exception because, although the instruction to “respond affirmatively” could have been misunderstood, no evidence showed a wavering juror, deadlock, non-unanimity, or an actual miscarriage of justice. It also found no error in the court’s asking whether polling was requested. Judge White concurred on sufficiency and polling but dissented on restitution, concluding that the award was within the trial court’s discretion.

Key Takeaways

  • Code § 18.2-286.1 requires proof of shooting from a vehicle and risk or apprehension to a natural person; property or animal endangerment alone does not satisfy those elements.
  • A provider’s voluntary reduction of charges did not establish a $22,796 loss incurred by the horse’s owner.
  • Reasonable veterinary expenses actually owed may exceed market value, but restitution must correspond to the victim’s proven loss.
  • The polling challenge failed on this record for lack of preservation and proof of manifest injustice, not because judicial polling comments can never violate due process.

Why It Matters

The decision separates factual sufficiency review from de novo statutory construction and limits restitution to losses supported by the statutory framework and evidence. It also distinguishes Puckett’s third-party-payment scenario from a provider’s own charitable charge reduction.

For trial practitioners, the opinion underscores the need to preserve intent and polling objections contemporaneously. Its polling ruling is circumstance-specific: the court acknowledged potentially problematic wording but found no affirmative showing that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

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