Background
Belaal Khan was hired as a police officer trainee by the Town of Purcellville in June 2022 after disclosing an unusual visual acuity score during his fitness-for-duty examination. He successfully completed police academy training and over 200 hours of field training without any supervisory concerns about his performance. In February 2023, Chief of Police Cynthia McAlister discontinued Khan’s field training based on his visual acuity and reassigned him to administrative duties.
Khan requested reasonable accommodation, submitting documentation from two ophthalmologists stating his vision met law enforcement requirements. He asked to return to active field duty “as is,” the same condition on which he was hired. When McAlister did not respond, Khan submitted a formal accommodation request in May 2023. McAlister ordered Khan to submit to an eye examination and subsequently advised him he would not return to field work. She offered an alternative administrative position and terminated Khan on September 20, 2023, citing performance issues over the preceding 30 days.
Khan filed suit against McAlister in her individual capacity under the Virginia Human Rights Act, alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation, retaliation for requesting accommodation, and denial of promotion opportunities based on required accommodations. McAlister moved to dismiss, arguing she did not qualify as an “employer” under the VHRA’s definition requiring employment of more than five employees.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that McAlister, in her individual capacity, is not an “employer” under the VHRA’s disability accommodation provisions and therefore cannot be sued directly. The court interpreted Code § 2.2-3905.1’s definition of “employer” as “any person, or agent of such person, employing more than five employees” to require that the entity itself employ the requisite number of workers. McAlister, as an individual supervisor, independently employs no one. The decisive question was whether “agent of such person” extends personal liability to individual employees.
Examining the statute’s text and structure, the court concluded the “agent” language imposes only respondeat superior liability—holding employers responsible for their agents’ acts—not direct individual liability. The court emphasized that if the General Assembly intended to impose individual liability, it would have expressly named individual roles as it did in the companion statute governing public accommodations, Code § 2.2-3904, which specifically lists “owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee.” The deliberate contrast demonstrated the legislature’s intent to limit individual liability for disability accommodation claims. The court also rejected Khan’s argument that common law wrongful discharge precedent required reading individual supervisor liability into the statute, noting that the VHRA creates purely statutory rights that exist independent of common law.
Key Takeaways
- Individual supervisors and managers cannot be sued in their personal capacity under the VHRA’s disability accommodation provisions; only the institutional employer qualifies as the proper defendant.
- The “agent of such person” language in employment discrimination statutes establishes respondeat superior liability rather than direct individual liability, consistent with federal ADA and Title VII interpretations.
- Statutory context matters: when the General Assembly names specific individual roles in related statutes, the omission of such detail in other provisions signals deliberate limitation of scope.
- Common law principles of agency and wrongful discharge do not extend to statutory discrimination claims absent clear legislative language.
Why It Matters
This decision establishes a significant limitation on individual liability in disability discrimination cases under Virginia law. Employees denied accommodations cannot pursue direct claims against their supervisors, even if the supervisor made discriminatory decisions; they must sue the employer entity itself. This creates a practical barrier to accountability, as plaintiffs in cases involving discriminatory individual supervisors must rely on the institution’s vicarious liability rather than holding the decision-maker directly responsible.
The ruling aligns Virginia’s VHRA with federal precedent under the ADA and Title VII, creating consistency across disability and civil rights discrimination frameworks. However, the court left unresolved other significant issues in the case—including whether administrative exhaustion is mandatory under the VHRA and what statute of limitations applies when receiving a federal EEOC right-to-sue notice—reserving those questions for future determination.