Background
Karen Taylor Kusterer was arrested for misdemeanor assault and battery. She entered into a written plea agreement with the Commonwealth under Virginia Code § 19.2-298.02 for a deferred disposition. The agreement required Kusterer to plead no contest and fulfill specified conditions, with the Commonwealth agreeing to dismiss the case if she complied. The signed agreement explicitly stated that Kusterer had “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive[d]” her constitutional right to appellate review, and the general district court judge confirmed that Kusterer had been advised of this waiver.
Nearly six months later, the Commonwealth moved to enter the conviction after finding Kusterer had failed to comply with the agreement’s terms and conditions. The general district court found non-compliance, convicted Kusterer of assault and battery, and sentenced her to 60 days in jail (suspended). Kusterer appealed to circuit court, but the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds that Kusterer had waived her appeal rights. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, holding that Kusterer’s appeal rights were validly waived under contract principles. The majority, writing by Judge Callins, found that the plain language of the deferred disposition agreement constituted an express, unambiguous waiver of Kusterer’s appeal rights. The court emphasized that appeal rights from general district courts are entirely statutory (not constitutionally guaranteed) and thus subject to waiver if done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
The majority interpreted the agreement’s language as waiving appellate review of the general district court’s decision “without limitation,” including the court’s finding that Kusterer failed to comply with the deferral conditions. The court noted that Kusterer understood the breadth of the waiver because the general district court judge had specifically advised her that the agreement involved a waiver of her right to appeal. Declining to reach statutory construction or constitutional questions on grounds of judicial restraint, the court resolved the case solely on contract interpretation principles.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Chaney argued that Virginia Code § 19.2-298.02(C) creates only a limited waiver conditioned on fulfillment of deferral terms, and that since Kusterer did not fulfill the conditions, the waiver never took effect. The dissent also raised concerns that the majority’s approach conflicts with Article I, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution, which preserves the right to appeal from courts not of record, and that a boilerplate form cannot expand statutory and constitutional limitations on appeal waivers.
Key Takeaways
- Defendants can waive statutory appeal rights through express written agreements in plea and deferred disposition agreements.
- Courts will enforce clear and unambiguous appeal waivers in writing when the defendant was advised of the waiver and signed voluntarily.
- Appeal waivers in deferred disposition agreements can encompass findings of violation as well as the original charge.
- The plain language of written agreements—not forms described as “boilerplate”—governs interpretation of appeal waiver scope.
Why It Matters
This decision is significant for criminal defendants, defense counsel, and prosecutors because it clarifies that deferred disposition agreements can include binding waivers of appellate review. The holding means defendants who enter such agreements need to carefully review and understand what appeal rights they are surrendering, as courts will enforce unambiguous waiver language. The case also demonstrates how appellate courts may resolve these disputes purely on contract grounds without reaching potentially broader constitutional or statutory questions about the limits of appeal waivers in courts not of record.
The dissenting opinion signals ongoing debate within Virginia courts about whether statutory appeal rights in criminal cases can be limited by form agreements, particularly when they affect contested violation proceedings separate from the original guilty plea. This may impact future litigation over the proper scope of appeal waivers under deferred disposition statutes.