Background
Washington law, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D), temporarily prohibits anyone convicted of two or more DUI offenses within seven years from possessing a firearm. Those disarmed under the statute may petition for restoration of their firearm rights after five years of law-abiding conduct in the community. The legislature enacted the restriction in 2023 based on findings that frequent risky alcohol use is a particularly strong risk factor for future violence, and considered studies linking prior DUI convictions to elevated risk of future violent and firearm-related crimes.
Geoffrey McLellan (three DUI convictions within seven years) and Jackson Holloway (two DUI convictions within seven years) applied for concealed carry permits, which were denied under the statute. They filed a declaratory judgment action challenging RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D) as applied to them under the Second Amendment. The trial court denied the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and allowed the case to proceed to develop a factual record, concluding there were material issues of fact about whether McLellan and Holloway individually posed a credible threat to public safety.
The State sought direct interlocutory review, and the Washington Supreme Court accepted the case to resolve whether the temporary firearm prohibition for recidivist DUI offenders violates the Second Amendment.
The Court’s Holding
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded for entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State. Writing for the majority, Justice González held that RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D) is constitutional on its face as applied categorically to recidivist DUI offenders, and that no individualized assessment of each offender’s dangerousness is required. The threshold Second Amendment question in a post-conviction challenge is whether the legislature may disarm a category of people based on the type of conviction at issue — not whether a specific individual poses a credible threat — and that question can be resolved as a matter of law on the pleadings.
The court identified three converging historical traditions that together support the statute: (1) a tradition of disarming categories of people who pose a heightened risk of danger, particularly where there is a plausible link to physical violence; (2) a tradition of restricting firearm possession for those convicted of serious crimes; and (3) a tradition of preventing the harmful combination of alcohol and firearms, including more recent restrictions on those with a history of dangerous alcohol misuse. The court acknowledged that none of these traditions in isolation would be sufficient, but held that in combination — especially given the legislature’s considered findings about the correlation between recidivist drunk driving and future violence — the statute fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. A “historical twin” is not required under N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen; a well-established and representative analogue suffices.
The majority distinguished United States v. Rahimi, which upheld disarmament tied to a civil domestic-violence restraining order and involved individualized judicial findings, noting that the civil restraining order context differs fundamentally from a post-conviction categorical restriction. In the latter context, the relevant constitutional question focuses on the nature of the conviction category, not the particular facts of any individual defendant.
Key Takeaways
- Washington’s temporary firearm ban for persons with two or more DUI convictions within seven years (RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D)) does not violate the Second Amendment, and courts need not conduct individualized dangerousness inquiries before applying it.
- In post-conviction categorical disarmament cases, the constitutional analysis turns on whether the legislature may disarm the class of offenders defined by the conviction type — not on whether each individual defendant personally poses a credible threat — distinguishing the civil restraining order framework of Rahimi.
- Three historical traditions collectively support the statute: categorical disarmament of dangerous groups, disarmament for serious criminal convictions, and restrictions tied to dangerous alcohol use; the court stressed that these traditions need not individually suffice when a legislature addresses a uniquely modern problem.
- The five-year pathway to rights restoration under RCW 9.41.041 reinforces the temporary and non-punitive character of the restriction, distinguishing it from permanent disarmament regimes.
Why It Matters
This decision is a significant post-Bruen/Rahimi data point on the permissible scope of categorical — as opposed to individualized — firearm disarmament. By holding that recidivist DUI convictions, a non-violent but inherently dangerous offense class, can support a categorical firearms prohibition without case-by-case dangerousness hearings, the Washington Supreme Court parts ways with at least one federal district court reaching the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The ruling may influence other states considering comparable alcohol-linked disarmament statutes, and it arrives as the U.S. Supreme Court has separately agreed to consider the constitutionality of the federal ban on firearm possession by unlawful drug users, United States v. Hemani.
Justice Whitener’s dissent argues the majority improperly extends categorical disarmament to people who have never been found individually dangerous and who have no history of violence, contending that Rahimi‘s “credible threat” language requires a closer nexus to physical violence than a DUI record supplies. That tension — categorical legislative judgment versus individualized judicial findings — is likely to remain a live fault line in Second Amendment litigation nationwide.