Background
Kurtis William Monschke was convicted in 2004 of aggravated first degree murder for a March 2003 offense and received the then-mandatory sentence of life without parole. In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for offenders aged 18 to 20 violated the Eighth Amendment. Monschke, who was 19 when he committed the offense, was resentenced in 2025 to 450 months.
At resentencing, the superior court wrote on the judgment that Monschke could receive up to one-third “good time,” to be calculated by the Department of Corrections under RCW 9.94A.729. DOC petitioned for postsentence review, arguing that aggravated first degree murder permitted no more than 15 percent earned early release time. The Pierce County prosecutor agreed that the one-third figure was wrong but argued that the court should strike the provision entirely because only DOC may award earned early release time.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” for purposes of RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b), following its recent decision in In re Personal Restraint of Benson. Although the statutory definition expressly lists first degree murder rather than aggravated first degree murder, aggravated first degree murder is a type of first degree murder. Because Monschke’s offense occurred before July 1, 2003, his earned early release time is capped at 15 percent.
But the court did not direct the sentencing court to substitute a 15 percent rate. Washington law delegates the authority to award earned early release time to DOC, not the superior court. The court therefore granted DOC’s petition in part and remanded with instructions to strike the entire unauthorized earned-early-release-time provision from the judgment and sentence.
Key Takeaways
- Aggravated first degree murder qualifies as a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b).
- For this pre-July 2003 offense, earned early release time may not exceed 15 percent of the sentence.
- A sentencing court cannot set an earned-early-release-time rate; that authority belongs exclusively to DOC.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that courts may not cure an incorrect earned-release-time calculation by imposing the correct statutory percentage themselves. Even when the applicable cap is clear, the sentencing judgment must leave the award and calculation of earned early release time to DOC.