Background
Kristopher Korsakas was charged with violations of domestic violence protection orders, domestic violence stalking, first degree criminal impersonation, and misdemeanor stalking. During trial, after the court admitted 404(b) evidence of a “three-part plan” involving possessive behavior, threats, and electronic surveillance, Korsakas decided to enter a guilty plea to all counts. The trial court conducted a thorough plea colloquy and accepted the plea, finding it knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
At sentencing, forty days later, Korsakas moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his counsel had been ineffective and the plea was involuntary. His attorney, without filing a written motion or making oral arguments, stated: “Can I let Mr. Korsakas make his motion, Your Honor? It’s collateral attack. I don’t normally get involved with that.” The trial court allowed Korsakas to present the motion himself, found it lacked merit, and denied it based on finding no manifest injustice under CrR 4.2(f). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Washington Supreme Court accepted review limited to whether Korsakas was entitled to have defense counsel argue his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, presenting the question of whether the denial of counsel at this critical stage constituted structural error requiring automatic reversal.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed, holding that Korsakas was not completely denied counsel at a critical stage of prosecution. While acknowledging that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before entry of judgment is a critical stage where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies, the court found no complete denial. Korsakas’ counsel remained appointed, continued representation, and was available throughout the sentencing hearing. Counsel did not move to withdraw, was not silenced, did not labor under a conflict of interest, and did not prevent Korsakas from being heard.
Under United States v. Cronic, complete denial of counsel occurs only when counsel is totally absent or prevented from assisting the defendant during a critical stage. Mere disagreement over trial strategy or counsel’s assessment of the merits of a motion does not establish a denial of the right to counsel. The court rejected Korsakas’ reliance on McCoy v. Louisiana, which protects a defendant’s autonomy to decide whether to admit guilt or maintain innocence at trial. Unlike in McCoy, counsel here did not concede guilt over objection, override a chosen defense, or alter the adversarial posture.
The court also rejected the argument that counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest simply because the motion alleged ineffective assistance. Washington law requires a defendant to demonstrate both that counsel had an actual conflict and that it adversely affected counsel’s performance. An allegation of ineffective assistance alone, without more, does not require substitution of counsel. The court noted, however, that Korsakas could potentially pursue an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington based on counsel’s characterization of the pre-judgment motion as a “collateral attack,” which was legally incorrect.
Key Takeaways
- Complete denial of counsel at a critical stage requires counsel to be totally absent or prevented from assisting, not merely disagreement over strategy or motion merit.
- An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel alone does not create an actual conflict of interest requiring appointment of substitute counsel.
- A motion to withdraw a guilty plea before entry of judgment can be made orally and requires no special written motion, notice, or service requirements under the criminal rules.
- Counsel’s continued availability and willingness to allow the defendant to be heard does not constitute a structural denial of counsel.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the narrow scope of structural error for “complete denial of counsel” in the Sixth Amendment context. It establishes that disagreement between counsel and client over whether to pursue a particular motion—even a motion that goes to the validity of a conviction—does not trigger the demanding standard of automatic reversal. The holding protects defendants’ ability to be heard on motions to withdraw guilty pleas while also respecting counsel’s judgment about litigation strategy, provided counsel remains available to assist.
Importantly, the court emphasized that defendants retain options: they can argue ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland if counsel’s conduct falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Here, counsel’s mischaracterization of a pre-judgment motion as a “collateral attack” (when the law is clear it is not) might support such a claim. The decision also provides procedural guidance that such motions need not follow formal written-motion requirements, allowing defendants flexibility in preserving the right to withdraw pleas before judgment is entered.