Background
In 2015, Washington charged Karen Peterson with felony possession of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.4013. She agreed to enter Snohomish County’s Adult Drug Treatment Court, waive certain trial rights, and pay a nonrefundable $900 participation fee in exchange for dismissal of the charge upon successful completion. Peterson graduated in 2017, and the superior court dismissed the charge with prejudice.
After the Washington Supreme Court invalidated the simple-possession statute in State v. Blake, Peterson moved under CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5) to vacate the dismissed charge and obtain a refund of the fee. The superior court granted relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Before the Supreme Court, Peterson clarified that she sought vacatur only as a means of obtaining the refund, and the State had already refunded the $900 without seeking its return.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part. It held that CrR 7.8(b)’s introductory language permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under each of the rule’s enumerated grounds. Blake’s invalidation of the possession statute was an extraordinary circumstance permitting Peterson to seek relief from the drug-court order under CrR 7.8(b)(5), although the order was not void for purposes of CrR 7.8(b)(4).
Peterson nevertheless lost on the merits. The lead opinion held that federal due process did not entitle her to reimbursement because she was never convicted or sentenced to pay legal financial obligations. Unlike the conviction-dependent assessments addressed in Nelson v. Colorado, Peterson’s fee arose from her agreement to participate in drug court and avoid conviction; Blake did not retroactively invalidate that agreement. The superior court therefore abused its discretion by ordering a refund based on an erroneous due-process ruling. The court declined to decide whether CrR 7.8 permits vacatur of a charge because Peterson had relinquished vacatur as an independent remedy.
The lead opinion also held that Peterson made the “substantial showing” required for the superior court to retain her CrR 7.8 motion because reasonable jurists could debate her due-process claim, even though it ultimately failed. Justice Mungia concurred only in the result and would have dismissed the case as moot. Chief Justice Stephens concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that CrR 7.8 did not authorize relief because no judgment existed. Justice González dissented and would have upheld the refund under the court’s inherent authority to remedy injustice.
Key Takeaways
- CrR 7.8(b)(5) may be used to challenge a final criminal order or proceeding even when the defendant was never convicted and no judgment was entered.
- Federal due process does not require reimbursement of a drug-court participation fee paid under an agreement to avoid conviction, even when the underlying possession statute was later held unconstitutional.
- A defendant makes a “substantial showing” under CrR 7.8(c)(2) when reasonable jurists could debate the claim; the defendant need not ultimately prevail on the merits.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes fees imposed because of an invalid conviction from payments made under diversion or drug-court agreements. It also broadens the procedural reach of CrR 7.8 beyond judgments while limiting the substantive refund remedy available to Blake-affected defendants who avoided conviction through drug court. The separate opinions expose disagreement over mootness, the rule’s scope, and courts’ inherent remedial authority.