Background
Austin Stone alleged that his defense attorney, George Eppler, negotiated a plea agreement calling for unsupervised probation. According to the complaint, the judge, prosecutor, Eppler, and Stone shared that understanding, and the sentencing court orally confirmed it. But the written judgment and sentence submitted to and accepted by the court instead imposed 12 months of Department of Corrections-supervised probation.
Believing his probation was unsupervised, Stone left Washington without contacting DOC. When he returned, he was arrested and allegedly subjected to solitary confinement and electronic home monitoring for failing to report. After obtaining a corrected judgment and sentence, Stone sued Eppler for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Eppler failed to ensure the written sentence matched the court’s oral ruling. The trial court dismissed both claims with prejudice under CR 12(b)(6), reasoning that the sentencing court’s error was a superseding cause of Stone’s injuries.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed. Accepting the complaint’s allegations and legally permissible hypothetical facts as true, the court held that the sentencing judge’s error was not a superseding cause as a matter of law. An erroneous sentence was reasonably foreseeable when counsel allegedly failed to correct a written judgment that conflicted with both the parties’ joint recommendation and the judge’s stated intent. The judicial error also produced the same type of harm that made the alleged failure tortious and was dependent on counsel’s alleged mistake rather than an independent sentencing decision.
The court further concluded that Stone’s allegations could encompass Eppler’s failure to correct the judgment after it was entered but before he formally withdrew. Because the sentencing court’s error preceded that alleged post-hearing breach, it could not constitute an intervening act as to that conduct. The court distinguished cases in which a judge independently chose an erroneous course after receiving all material information. It reversed dismissal of the malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims and remanded for further proceedings, without deciding whether Stone could ultimately establish breach, injury, or the other elements of those claims.
Key Takeaways
- A judicial error is a superseding cause only when it is not reasonably foreseeable; the issue ordinarily presents a factual question unless reasonable minds could not differ.
- A sentencing judge’s exclusive authority to impose a sentence does not automatically eliminate causation where counsel allegedly supplied or failed to correct inaccurate sentencing paperwork.
- An alleged failure to correct a judgment after its entry cannot be superseded by the earlier judicial act of entering that judgment.
Why It Matters
The decision limits the use of superseding-cause doctrine to dispose of attorney-liability claims at the pleading stage merely because a judge entered the operative order. When counsel’s alleged error contributed to the court receiving incomplete or inaccurate information, the judge’s action may be a concurrent cause rather than an independent event that cuts off liability.
The ruling also underscores defense counsel’s potential exposure for failing to verify that a written criminal judgment accurately reflects the agreed recommendation and the sentencing court’s oral decision, including during the interval after sentencing and before formal withdrawal.