Background
The West Virginia Department of Human Services filed an abuse and neglect petition in May 2024 after L.B., one of the four children, arrived at school with extensive bruising — including a bruised lip, blackening eye, and burst vessels in his neck — and reported that his stepfather had punched and slapped him. The petition was amended in June 2024 to add allegations that the stepfather had also sexually abused P.G. over many years. In a forensic interview, P.G. disclosed that she had told her mother, Petitioner R.P., about the abuse once, but that her mother “acted like she didn’t know what to do.” P.G. stopped reporting because she knew “nothing would change.” Shortly after her forensic interview, P.G. tested positive for two sexually transmitted diseases; the petitioner later admitted to a police investigator that she had contracted chlamydia from the stepfather as well.
During adjudicatory hearings spanning July through December 2024, evidence established that the petitioner had been aware of the stepfather’s conduct for years. She had removed him from the home in August 2022 following P.G.’s prior disclosure of sexual abuse, but took no steps to seek counseling or medical care for the child, suspected her own mother had coached P.G.’s disclosure, and then reconciled with and married the stepfather after becoming pregnant. When a CPS worker initially suggested a domestic violence protective order or removal of the stepfather from the home, the petitioner declined, telling the worker it would be “inconvenient” because the stepfather provided childcare and financial support. In a January 2025 filing, the petitioner conceded she did not dispute the abuse allegations and acknowledged she had failed to adequately protect the children.
The circuit court adjudicated all four children — including the younger siblings M.P. and T.P., who were found to be similarly situated in the home — as abused and/or neglected. The petitioner moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. At the April 2025 dispositional hearing, she testified that she had since divorced the stepfather, was attending individual therapy, and was employed, but her answers about what she should have done differently focused on her own need to be less trusting of people rather than on the harm to her children. The circuit court denied the improvement period, found no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect and abuse could be substantially corrected, and terminated the petitioner’s parental rights to all four children. The permanency plan for each child is adoption in their respective placements.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the circuit court’s May 9, 2025, termination order. On the question of P.G.’s wishes, the court held that consideration of a child’s preferences is statutorily required only for children fourteen years of age or older (or those otherwise determined by the court to be of an age of discretion under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)). Because P.G. was twelve, no such obligation arose, and the petitioner had neither presented evidence that P.G. was of an age of discretion nor objected at the hearing — precluding appellate review of the issue.
On the denial of an improvement period, the court acknowledged that the circuit court had cited an incorrect legal standard but found the error harmless because the record independently demonstrated that improvement was unlikely. Citing In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44 (2013), the court reiterated that a parent must recognize her own conduct as abusive — not merely acknowledge the abuser’s conduct — for an improvement period to be meaningful. Here, the petitioner consistently deflected responsibility: she rationalized marrying the stepfather after P.G.’s disclosure by pointing to the children’s apparent acquiescence, minimized her inaction by claiming P.G. had not been “ready” to speak out, and gave dispositional testimony focused on her own needs rather than her children’s welfare.
On termination, the court rejected the argument that the DHS had presented insufficient evidence at disposition. The court reaffirmed that the DHS is not required to follow any particular mode of proof, and that here the DHS’s decision to call the petitioner and elicit her own testimony was a permissible and adequate evidentiary approach. The circuit court’s finding that the petitioner demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect — the statutory definition of “no reasonable likelihood” under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d) — was supported by the record, as was its finding that the children’s welfare and need for stability necessitated termination.
Key Takeaways
- West Virginia’s statute requires circuit courts to consider a child’s wishes regarding termination only when the child is fourteen or older, or is affirmatively determined by the court to be of an age of discretion; a twelve-year-old’s wishes are not automatically entitled to consideration.
- An incorrect legal standard applied to an improvement-period denial is harmless error where the record independently supports the conclusion that improvement was unlikely — particularly when a parent fails to acknowledge her own abusive or neglectful conduct and gives self-focused testimony at disposition.
- The DHS need not present formal witness testimony of its own at a dispositional hearing; calling the respondent parent and eliciting her testimony is a permissible way to meet the clear-and-convincing burden for termination.
- A parent’s failure to act on a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse — including taking no protective, medical, or counseling steps and subsequently marrying the abuser — can support a finding of inadequate capacity to correct conditions of abuse, warranting termination.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar West Virginia courts apply when a parent seeks to avoid termination after prolonged failure to protect children from an abusive partner. The opinion makes clear that superficial steps taken after removal — such as divorcing the abuser, attending therapy, and maintaining employment — will not necessarily warrant an improvement period if the parent’s testimony reveals a continuing inability to genuinely recognize her own role in the children’s harm. The court’s focus on the petitioner’s self-referential answers at disposition signals that judges may treat dispositional testimony as a window into parental capacity, not merely a recitation of compliance steps.
The decision also provides practical guidance for practitioners on two recurring procedural issues: the age-of-discretion threshold for consulting children about termination, and the adequacy of DHS evidence at disposition. By confirming that the DHS may satisfy its evidentiary burden by calling a respondent parent as a witness, the court affirms flexibility in how child welfare agencies structure their dispositional presentations — while making clear that a parent’s own words can be the most damning evidence against her.