Background
On September 12, 2019, Sean McKee purchased a 2016 Subaru WRX in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, trading in a 2015 Ford Focus that was listed on his State Farm auto policy. McKee claimed he called his personal State Farm agent, Parker Hall Insurance Agency, that same day to report the trade and ask that the WRX be added to the policy — a call corroborated by his cell phone records showing a four-minute-and-forty-eight-second conversation. He also alleged that a Ron Lewis dealership employee independently called Parker Hall per its standard business practice, and that McKee left a voicemail with Parker Hall on September 14, 2019, confirming delivery of the WRX.
On October 3, 2019 — more than 14 days after purchase — McKee was seriously injured in a collision caused by another driver. His injuries required multiple surgeries and generated medical expenses exceeding $500,000. When he sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits, State Farm denied coverage on the ground that the WRX was not a “newly acquired car” under the policy (which defines that status as expiring after 14 calendar days) and was not listed on the declarations page at the time of the accident. State Farm’s position was that it first learned of the WRX on October 4, 2019, when McKee called to report both the purchase and the accident.
McKee filed suit in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County in October 2021, asserting five counts including a UIM coverage claim, bad faith, and an errors-and-omissions claim against Parker Hall. After discovery, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment to State Farm on Count I, concluding that because the WRX was not on the declarations page at the time of the accident, no UIM coverage existed “within the four corners of the Policy.” The court explicitly stated that the parties’ dispute over whether McKee had given pre-accident notice was “not relevant” to the UIM coverage count. McKee appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed the partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that a genuine dispute of material fact exists — specifically, whether McKee timely notified Parker Hall within 14 days of the WRX’s delivery and requested that it be added to the policy. Under the policy’s General Terms, an insured who makes such a request before the newly acquired car period expires is entitled to coverage retroactive to the date of delivery. Because McKee presented evidence (his affidavit, corroborating phone records, and the alleged dealership contact) that he made exactly that request on September 12, 2019, the factual dispute is both genuine and material, and it was error for the circuit court to resolve it on summary judgment.
The court further held that the circuit court erred by ignoring the agency relationship between State Farm and Parker Hall. Under established West Virginia law, an insurance agent with actual authority to act on an insurer’s behalf binds the insurer to the agent’s actions and inactions. Because Parker Hall undisputedly had actual authority to act for State Farm, any notice McKee gave to Parker Hall was effectively notice to State Farm — making the question of whether Parker Hall received timely notice directly dispositive of State Farm’s coverage obligation on Count I.
The court was careful to note that its decision does not render “owned but not insured” exclusions in UIM policies unenforceable in West Virginia; it held only that the specific facts of this case precluded summary judgment. The panel unanimously concurred, and State Farm’s last-minute motion to dismiss the appeal as moot — based on a $100,000 payment tendered to McKee in April 2026 — was denied before the decision issued.
Key Takeaways
- A disputed factual question about whether an insured timely notified his agent of a new vehicle purchase is material to a UIM coverage claim and cannot be resolved on summary judgment; it must go to the jury.
- Under West Virginia law, notice to an insurance agent with actual authority to act for the insurer constitutes notice to the insurer itself — courts evaluating coverage disputes must account for that agency relationship rather than looking solely at the declarations page.
- The policy’s General Terms, not just the declarations page, govern coverage: an insured who requests vehicle substitution within the 14-day newly-acquired-car window can secure coverage backdated to the delivery date, even if the declarations page was never formally updated before a loss.
- A partial post-appeal settlement payment does not automatically moot a coverage appeal where the underlying coverage dispute remains live.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that West Virginia insurers cannot obtain summary judgment on coverage simply by pointing to a declarations page that omits the vehicle at issue, when the insured presents credible evidence — including phone records — that he timely contacted the agent to add the vehicle. Courts must examine what the agent actually knew and when, because the insurer owns its agent’s knowledge. Insurers and agents who fail to document or act on customer calls face significant exposure if an accident occurs before the paperwork catches up.
For policyholders and plaintiffs’ counsel, the decision is a useful reminder that policy General Terms may provide a coverage pathway independent of the declarations page, and that corroborating electronic evidence (call logs, voicemails) can be enough to survive summary judgment and reach a jury on notice disputes. The court’s explicit reservation — that “owned but not insured” exclusions remain valid in West Virginia — signals that the outcome turns on contested facts, not a broad pro-coverage rule, leaving the coverage question open for the factfinder on remand.