Background
In September 2021, Semper Fi Paving’s truck was damaged and required repairs. On November 2, 2021, Semper Fi had the truck towed to Granna Operating’s facility. Granna agreed to perform repairs pursuant to an estimate authorized by Semper Fi’s insurance carrier. Granna received payment from the insurance company in December 2021.
Semper Fi alleges that Granna verbally agreed to complete the repairs and return the truck by April 2022, in time for the 2022 paving season. However, Granna did not complete the repairs and return the truck until November 2022—eleven months late. Because the truck was unavailable during the 2022 paving season, Semper Fi was unable to conduct business that year.
Semper Fi sued for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. After discovery, Granna filed a motion for summary judgment. Semper Fi withdrew its negligence and fraud claims but argued there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the breach of contract claim. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Granna, dismissing the case. Semper Fi appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment. In response to Granna’s motion, Semper Fi presented an affidavit from its managing member, Deborah Jewell, stating that a Granna representative verbally agreed to complete repairs by April 2022. Semper Fi’s owner, Christopher Jewell, testified in his deposition that Granna had agreed to repair the truck within two weeks and that Granna installed the wrong type of tarp—a cheaper, unusable model—on the truck.
The circuit court had disregarded this testimony as “self-serving” and “uncorroborated.” The appellate court disagreed, finding that this evidence consisted of specific factual representations about what was said and agreed to, not bare conclusory assertions. The court emphasized that West Virginia law permits a plaintiff’s own testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact on disputed issues, particularly when the testimony is replete with specific facts and occurrences subject to cross-examination and rebuttal.
Critically, the court held that the circuit court erred by effectively weighing the credibility of witnesses and determining the truth of disputed facts at the summary judgment stage. The court must instead determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Because there was no written contract and the repair estimate contained no time frame, West Virginia law permits witness testimony to establish the contract terms. Therefore, Semper Fi’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial.
Key Takeaways
- A party’s own testimony can create a genuine factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment, so long as it is specific and factual rather than conclusory or self-serving assertions.
- Courts must not weigh evidence or judge witness credibility at the summary judgment stage; those functions belong exclusively to the jury.
- When a written contract is absent, incomplete, or silent on material terms, witness testimony can establish what was orally agreed between the parties.
- The circuit court’s reversal was based on error in applying summary judgment standards, though the case still must be proven at trial.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the proper scope of summary judgment in contract disputes. Many business relationships, especially informal or urgent repair situations, rely on oral agreements. The ruling protects parties who rely on verbal commitments by ensuring that credible, specific testimony about what was agreed—particularly from company principals—is not discarded simply because it comes from the plaintiff.
For practitioners, the decision clarifies that West Virginia courts will not short-circuit jury trials by substituting judicial credibility assessments for the jury’s role. The case returns to trial, where Granna will have the opportunity to present its own evidence and challenge Semper Fi’s account through cross-examination and contradictory testimony.