Background
Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Deputy Quinton Miller stopped Troy Michael Tordoer for a traffic violation in the early morning hours of New Year’s Day. After observing signs of intoxication and Tordoer’s poor performance on field sobriety tests, Deputy Miller arrested him for operating while under the influence (OWI). While Tordoer was secured in the squad car, the deputy explained the process for evidentiary testing. He stated that with Tordoer’s consent, they would go for a blood draw and he could then be picked up. Without consent, the deputy said, “I’m going to have to get a warrant. That’s probably going to take two, three hours.”
Following this explanation, Deputy Miller read Tordoer the official “Informing the Accused” (IAF) form as required by Wisconsin’s implied consent statute. Tordoer then consented to a blood test, which revealed a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) of 0.178. He was charged with first-offense OWI and operating with a PAC.
Tordoer filed a motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that his consent was not voluntary. He claimed the deputy’s statements before reading the official form were coercive, suggesting that his release was conditioned on consenting and that a warrant was inevitable. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the deputy’s statements were truthful explanations of the process and that Tordoer’s consent was voluntary. Tordoer appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Tordoer’s consent to the blood draw was voluntary and not the product of coercion. The court analyzed the issue under the “totality of the circumstances,” focusing on whether the deputy’s statements rendered Tordoer’s choice unconstrained.
The court rejected Tordoer’s comparison to cases where consent was found involuntary. Unlike in Bumper v. North Carolina, Deputy Miller did not claim to already possess a warrant; he stated he would “have to get” one, which accurately communicated he did not yet have one but intended to seek one. The court also distinguished the case from State v. Blackman, noting that Tordoer was not misled about the legal consequences of refusal, nor was he told a blood draw was inevitable department policy. The deputy’s statements were found to be truthful predictions of the process, not misrepresentations.
The court concluded that informing Tordoer that refusing the test would lead to a longer period in custody while a warrant was sought was not a coercive threat, but rather a “truthful and reasonable prediction.” This information, the court reasoned, contributed positively to Tordoer’s decision-making by allowing him to weigh his options with accurate information. Considering the deputy’s congenial tone, the lack of threats, and the proper reading of the IAF form, the court found clear and convincing evidence that Tordoer’s consent was voluntary.
Key Takeaways
- An officer stating they will “get a warrant” if an OWI suspect refuses a chemical test does not, by itself, render consent involuntary. This is distinct from falsely claiming to already have a warrant.
- Truthfully informing a suspect of the practical consequences of refusing consent, such as a longer detention period while police seek a warrant, is not considered unconstitutionally coercive.
- The voluntariness of consent is determined by the “totality of the circumstances,” including the officer’s tone, the accuracy of their statements, and whether the suspect was properly informed of their right to refuse.
Why It Matters
This decision provides further guidance on the line between permissible police communication and unconstitutional coercion during OWI stops. It clarifies that officers can explain the real-world, procedural delays associated with refusing consent without necessarily invalidating a subsequent consent to a search. The opinion reinforces that truthful and non-threatening explanations of process can be seen by courts not as coercion, but as providing a suspect with more information to make their choice. The ruling underscores the judiciary’s liberal construction of Wisconsin’s implied consent law, which is designed to facilitate the collection of evidence to combat drunk driving, while still grounding the final analysis in Fourth Amendment principles of voluntary consent.