Background
In September 2021, Jose Alfredo Castillo Lira was arrested and charged in Clark County, Wisconsin with two counts of delivering and one count of possession with intent to deliver Tramadol, a schedule IV controlled substance. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security had already issued a notice of detainer against Castillo Lira before his criminal case began. His trial counsel, Attorney Zachary Glascock, retained an immigration attorney early in the representation to assess the immigration consequences of the charges. The immigration attorney’s opinion letter — shared with Castillo Lira, his English-speaking daughter, and the State — warned that a conviction would likely constitute an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), subjecting Castillo Lira to expedited or automatic deportation and mandatory immigration detention.
Glascock attempted to negotiate a misdemeanor plea to avoid severe immigration consequences, but the State refused. In January 2023, Castillo Lira pleaded no contest to a single felony count of delivering a schedule IV drug, with the remaining counts dismissed and read in for sentencing. The circuit court provided a Spanish-language interpreter, administered the standard deportation warning during the plea colloquy, and Castillo Lira indicated he had no questions. The court withheld sentence and placed him on three years’ probation with a nine-month conditional jail term.
In April 2025, with deportation proceedings underway, Castillo Lira moved to withdraw his plea, vacate his conviction, and reopen the case. He claimed Glascock never told him the offense was a mandatory deportable offense — only that deportation was a possibility. The circuit court held a Machner hearing, credited Glascock’s testimony that he had discussed immigration consequences with Castillo Lira on multiple occasions using a Spanish interpreter and the Spanish-language plea questionnaire, and denied the motion. Castillo Lira appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial, holding that Glascock’s performance was not constitutionally deficient under the Strickland v. Washington two-prong test as applied to immigration advice under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The court found that Glascock went well beyond the minimum required: he hired an immigration specialist, shared the written opinion with his client through an interpreter, reviewed the immigration consequences section of the Spanish-language plea questionnaire, and attempted to negotiate a plea that would avoid adverse immigration outcomes. The circuit court’s factual finding that no communication barriers existed between counsel and client — supported by Glascock’s uncontroverted testimony — was not clearly erroneous.
The court rejected Castillo Lira’s argument that counsel was required to tell him deportation was certain or “mandatory” rather than highly probable. Relying on State v. Villegas, 380 Wis. 2d 246 (Ct. App. 2018), and State v. Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63 (2015), the court reaffirmed that criminal defense attorneys are not immigration law specialists and are not required to make definitive deportation predictions. Because deportation ultimately depends on federal prosecutorial discretion, overstating certainty could itself constitute harmful misinformation. Advice that conviction would likely result in deportation — communicated through a retained immigration attorney’s opinion letter — satisfied the Padilla standard.
Having found no deficient performance, the court did not reach the prejudice prong of Strickland and affirmed on that basis alone. The opinion was designated unpublished and may not be cited as precedent except as permitted by Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(3).
Key Takeaways
- Defense counsel satisfies Padilla‘s immigration-advice obligation by retaining an immigration attorney to provide a written opinion on deportation risk and communicating that opinion to the client through a competent interpreter — even if counsel does not use the precise phrase “mandatory deportation.”
- Wisconsin courts do not require criminal defense attorneys to guarantee or predict with certainty that a plea will result in deportation; advising a defendant that conviction will likely or very probably trigger removal is constitutionally sufficient, because deportation ultimately rests on federal executive discretion.
- A defendant seeking post-sentencing plea withdrawal bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence; credibility determinations made by the circuit court at a Machner hearing will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
- The fact that a written immigration opinion may not have been formally translated does not undermine counsel’s performance where the circuit court found the substance of that opinion was communicated to the client through an interpreter with no identified communication barriers.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the practical boundaries of Padilla compliance in Wisconsin. It confirms that proactive steps — retaining specialized immigration counsel, sharing written opinions with defendants, and reviewing plea forms in the client’s language — constitute more than adequate discharge of the Sixth Amendment duty to advise on deportation consequences. Attorneys who take these steps are well-positioned to defeat post-conviction ineffective-assistance claims even when a client later argues the advice was not sufficiently dire or definitive.
The case also highlights the tension non-citizen defendants face when balancing jail time against immigration exposure. Castillo Lira’s own stated strategy — minimizing incarceration to reduce the likelihood DHS would initiate removal — illustrates how immigration stakes can drive plea decisions in ways that may leave defendants vulnerable regardless of how thoroughly counsel advises them. Defense practitioners representing non-citizen clients should document every immigration-related discussion carefully, as Machner hearings turn heavily on credibility and the evidentiary record counsel creates at the time of the plea.