Background
Stetson Okeefe Grant was convicted of stalking and disorderly conduct based on his treatment of his estranged wife after she said she wanted a divorce. Evidence at trial showed that Grant repeatedly called and texted her, came to her home uninvited, refused to leave, threatened suicide or harm to the family, blocked her from leaving, and punched holes in a wall. His wife recorded numerous interactions and testified that his conduct made her feel trapped, threatened, intimidated, and harassed.
Grant appealed only the stalking conviction. At trial, he asked the circuit court to supplement Wisconsin’s pattern stalking instruction with language from the civil harassment-injunction statute defining certain harassment as conduct that “serve[s] no legitimate purpose.” He argued that his conduct had the legitimate purpose of trying to reconcile the marriage. The circuit court declined to add that language, and the jury found him guilty of stalking based on conduct occurring between April 21 and May 1, 2019.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the pattern stalking instruction accurately and completely stated the law by requiring proof that Grant intentionally engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, actually caused the victim such distress, and involved at least one act that Grant knew or should have known would cause that result. The statutory phrase “serious emotional distress” includes feeling terrified, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or tormented, and jurors could apply the ordinary meaning of “harassed.”
The court held that stalking does not require separate proof that the defendant’s conduct served no legitimate purpose. Importing that requirement from one definition in the civil harassment-injunction statute would have confused the jury and misstated the law. The legislature separately treats stalking itself as a form of harassment supporting an injunction, and conduct satisfying the elements of stalking cannot be excused by a claimed purpose such as saving a marriage. Grant remained free to argue that his purpose showed he neither intended nor caused serious emotional distress, but the jury was entitled to reject that account.
Key Takeaways
- Wisconsin’s pattern stalking instruction, WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1284, accurately and completely states the elements of stalking.
- The stalking statute does not require the State to prove that allegedly harassing conduct served no legitimate purpose.
- A defendant’s claimed conciliatory motive may be argued to the jury on intent and emotional distress, but it does not create an additional statutory defense.
Why It Matters
The decision prevents defendants from importing the civil harassment-injunction statute’s “no legitimate purpose” language into criminal stalking prosecutions. Wisconsin stalking cases turn on the statutory course-of-conduct, knowledge, reasonable-person, and actual-distress requirements—not on whether the accused asserts a legitimate objective.
The ruling also confirms that trial courts may rely on the pattern stalking instruction without separately defining “harassed,” because the term carries its ordinary meaning in the stalking statute.