Background
Steven Lamar Harris was tried on charges of second-degree sexual assault, felony bail jumping, misdemeanor battery, and felony intimidation of a victim. During deliberations, the jury reported that one juror had repeatedly expressed hesitation about sending a “black man” to jail without definitive physical evidence. The trial court viewed the note as indicating that a juror had improperly considered punishment and injected race into the deliberations.
After the court expressed concern that a mistrial was necessary, Harris’s co-counsel said that a mistrial was “perfectly fine with us” and twice confirmed the defense’s agreement. The court declared a mistrial. Harris later moved to dismiss the charges on double-jeopardy grounds. Although the motion court expressly found that the defense had consented to the mistrial, it dismissed the case with prejudice because the defense had not initiated or formally moved for the mistrial and because it was concerned about co-counsel’s limited experience.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that defense counsel’s undisputed consent to the mistrial removed the double-jeopardy barrier to retrying Harris. The legal distinction drawn by the motion court between consenting to a mistrial and affirmatively moving for one was immaterial.
The court also held that consent communicated through counsel did not require a personal, knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver from Harris. Co-counsel’s alleged inexperience did not invalidate the consent, particularly because co-counsel confirmed that he had consulted primary trial counsel. Because Harris consented, the appellate court did not decide whether manifest necessity independently justified the mistrial.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant may be retried after a mistrial when defense counsel unequivocally consents to it.
- For double-jeopardy purposes, consent to a mistrial is legally sufficient even if the defense did not propose or formally request the mistrial.
- A court need not conduct a personal waiver colloquy with the defendant before accepting counsel’s consent to a mistrial.
Why It Matters
The decision emphasizes that counsel’s clear agreement to a mistrial generally removes the constitutional bar to a second trial, regardless of who first suggested the mistrial or whether the court prompted the defense’s response. Once the motion court found that Harris’s counsel had consented, it was required to deny dismissal on double-jeopardy grounds. The case was remanded for trial.