Background
A jury convicted Amber M. Lundgren of first-degree intentional homicide and carrying a concealed weapon for fatally shooting Christopher Lytle twice in the back of the head and neck at a remote turnaround. Lundgren admitted the shooting but asserted self-defense, testifying that Lytle became violent and attempted to sexually assault her. The State argued that she killed Lytle to demonstrate commitment to her ex-husband.
Before trial, Lundgren sought to introduce Lytle’s text exchanges with four women as evidence of his “sexual proclivities.” The messages concerned subjects including consensual sexual practices, sex in cars or on a backroad, and exchanging marijuana for sex or sexual acts. She also sought to introduce Lytle’s statements to others that he had PTSD and expert testimony about a possible relationship between PTSD and sexual aggression. The circuit court excluded this evidence. On appeal, Lundgren challenged the exclusion of the text messages and Lytle’s PTSD statements, but she did not challenge the exclusion of the expert testimony.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the circuit court reasonably excluded the text messages under the third step of Wisconsin’s other-acts analysis. Although the circuit court found that the messages had a permissible purpose and were relevant, it reasonably determined that their minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The messages reflected interests in consensual sexual activity, not nonconsensual conduct, and therefore did little to support Lundgren’s claim that Lytle attempted to sexually assault her. They also risked causing jurors to judge Lytle negatively because of his sexual interests.
The court also held that Lytle’s statements that he had PTSD did not fall within the hearsay exception for statements of a declarant’s then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition. A statement that a person has PTSD identifies a medical condition but says little about that person’s state of mind at the time of the statement. Because the circuit court committed no error, the appellate court did not address the State’s harmless-error arguments.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence of a homicide victim’s consensual sexual interests may be excluded when it offers little support for a defendant’s claim of attempted sexual assault and creates a substantial risk of unfair prejudice.
- A person’s statement that the person has PTSD is not, by itself, a statement of then-existing state of mind or physical condition under Wisconsin’s hearsay exception.
- The appeal did not challenge the separate ruling excluding expert testimony that PTSD could cause sexual aggression.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the discretion Wisconsin trial courts retain when balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of other-acts evidence, particularly evidence concerning a victim’s consensual sexual behavior. A proposed connection to the defense theory does not require admission when the evidence does not support an inference of nonconsensual conduct.
The opinion also draws a distinction between a contemporaneous description of a person’s mental or physical state and a general statement identifying a medical diagnosis. That distinction limits the use of the then-existing-state-of-mind exception to admit otherwise hearsay statements about PTSD.