- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department
- Case
- Beaton v. Tomco Mechanical, Inc.
- Date
- June 3, 2026
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03419
Background
Plaintiff Shelly Beaton commenced this action against Tamco Mechanical, Inc. (Tamco) and another defendant to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained while working at Rikers Island. Tamco moved for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law Section 200, which codifies the common-law duty of property owners and general contractors to provide workers with a safe workplace.
Tamco argued that the allegedly dangerous condition did not exist a week prior to the plaintiff’s accident and that Tamco’s employees performed no work at the premises between that time and the date of the accident. In opposition, plaintiff submitted an affirmation of a witness who had not been disclosed during discovery, along with her own hearsay deposition testimony regarding when Tamco employees last worked at the premises. Supreme Court, Kings County (Francois A. Rivera, J.), denied the relevant branch of Tamco’s motion. Tamco appealed.
Holding
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the order insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and granted Tamco’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law Section 200 cause of action. The Court held that Tamco established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the allegedly dangerous condition did not exist a week before the accident and that Tamco performed no work at the premises in the interim.
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Court held that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering an affirmation from an undisclosed witness, as plaintiff failed to disclose the witness to Tamco and offered no valid excuse for the failure, citing CPLR 3101(a) and Krehl v. Siberio, 228 AD3d 852, 854. The plaintiff’s hearsay deposition testimony about when Tamco employees last worked at the premises was the only remaining evidence in opposition and was insufficient standing alone to raise a triable issue of fact.
Takeaways
This decision underscores two critical evidentiary principles in summary judgment practice. First, courts will preclude affirmations from witnesses not disclosed during discovery where the party offers no valid excuse for the nondisclosure, even at the summary judgment stage. Second, hearsay deposition testimony, when it constitutes the sole basis for opposing summary judgment, is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. Practitioners must ensure all witnesses are properly disclosed and that opposition to summary judgment is supported by admissible evidence.
Why It Matters
For Labor Law practitioners, this case is a reminder that timing evidence—specifically, proof of when a condition came into existence relative to when a defendant’s employees last worked at the premises—can be dispositive on the issue of creation or notice of a dangerous condition. Defendants who can establish a temporal gap between their last work at a site and the appearance of a hazardous condition have a strong basis for summary judgment. Plaintiffs must be prepared with admissible, properly disclosed evidence to bridge that gap. The Court’s strict approach to disclosure obligations and hearsay further emphasizes the importance of thorough pre-trial preparation.