- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department
- Case
- Chaya v. Maimonides Medical Center
- Date
- June 3, 2026
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03420
Background
Plaintiff, as parent and natural guardian of her child, commenced this action for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent in connection with treatment rendered to the infant, who was born prematurely at 24 weeks and 4 days gestation at defendant Maimonides Medical Center. During oral argument on defendant’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff abandoned all but four theories of liability against the neonatology staff: (1) failure to intubate the infant and administer surfactant promptly following delivery; (2) failure to conduct a proper differential diagnosis regarding the infant’s oxygen desaturations during her second day of life; (3) failure to administer a second dose of surfactant between 8 and 12 hours after the initial treatment; and (4) failure to timely transfuse packed red blood cells to treat the infant’s anemia and hypoxia.
Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court, Kings County (Ellen M. Spodek, J.), denied the motion in its entirety. Defendant appealed.
Holding
The Appellate Division, Second Department, modified the order by granting summary judgment on theories (1) and (2)—the failure to intubate and administer surfactant promptly and the failure to conduct a proper differential diagnosis—and by dismissing the informed consent cause of action. The Court otherwise affirmed, leaving intact the denial of summary judgment on theories (3) (second surfactant dose) and (4) (timely blood transfusion).
As to theories (1) and (2), the Court found the defendant met its prima facie burden and that plaintiff’s expert opinions in opposition were speculative or conclusory, failing to address specific assertions by the movant’s experts with explanations supported by specifically cited evidence in the record. As to the informed consent claim, the Court concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain it.
However, on theories (3) and (4), conflicting medical expert opinions precluded summary judgment, as the standard recognizes that “summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions.”
Takeaways
This decision highlights the critical importance of expert affidavit quality in medical malpractice summary judgment practice. Expert opinions must be specific, not conclusory, and must directly address the movant’s expert assertions with reasoning grounded in cited record evidence. Where an opposing expert fails to meet this standard, those particular theories of liability will be dismissed even if other theories survive. The partial modification here demonstrates that courts analyze each theory of liability independently.
Why It Matters
Medical malpractice practitioners on both sides should carefully evaluate each theory of liability as a separate summary judgment battleground. This case shows that plaintiff’s counsel cannot rely on a single expert affidavit to carry all theories—each must be specifically and non-conclusorily addressed. For defense counsel, the ruling confirms that breaking a complaint down into discrete theories and addressing each with specific expert analysis can yield partial summary judgment even when some claims survive. The opinion also reiterates the high standard for expert qualifications when opining outside one’s specialty area.