The Third Department held that a without-prejudice dismissal at the first stage of a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act resentencing request is not appealable.
The First Department vacated a $301.25 million Manhattan land valuation because the neutral umpire’s outside-employment discussions and later procedural rulings created prejudicial partiality.
The First Department enforced a sophisticated-party nonrecourse clause to dismiss tortious-interference claims arising from a disputed energy-company equity transaction.
The First Department reinstated a hedge-fund jury verdict, holding that overlapping facts and a theoretical risk of inconsistent findings did not justify retrying five rejected counterclaims.
The First Department exercised interest-of-justice discretion to send a 17-year-old’s weapon case to Family Court because prosecutors had not shown extraordinary circumstances overcoming Raise the Age’s removal presumption.
The Second Department held that CPL 420.45 may render a fraudulent deed void from inception after a false-filing conviction even when no signature was forged.
The Second Department held that release on bail pauses CPL 30.30(2)(a)’s 90-day custody clock and that later recommitment resumes, rather than resets, the count.
The Second Department permanently stayed arbitration against a demolition subcontractor whose contract required mediation followed by litigation and contained a void unilateral arbitration option.
The Second Department upheld DHCR’s denial of a rent-stabilization exemption because the owner failed to prove serious deterioration and replacement of 75% of building systems.
The Second Department held that a three-foot fall from a skid-steer step was outside Labor Law § 240(1), while negligence and an illumination-based § 241(6) theory survived.
The Second Department upheld Suffolk County’s DWI vehicle-forfeiture law and found forfeiture of a $21,000 Nissan proportionate to a repeat felony DWI involving extreme speeding.
The Third Department reinstated grandparent-visitation petitions and ordered immediate contact where Family Court failed to weigh each child’s best interests and less restrictive safeguards.
The First Department held that gradual acid-rock drainage fell within pollution exclusions and that Canadian law would not materially change the coverage result.
The First Department enforced an RMBS no-action clause because HBK’s zero-principal-balance certificates carried no voting rights when it demanded litigation.
The First Department held that inaccurately transcribing a seizure date onto a DMV physician form is ordinary negligence governed by a three-year limitations period.
The First Department held that a title agent’s guarantor lacked a common-law indemnity claim against a recording vendor that owed him no separate duty.
The First Department dismissed a school aide’s injury claim because a recess contractor owed no third-party duty and an errant basketball was an assumed risk.
The First Department vacated an antisuit injunction because a Delaware action over a later agreement did not threaten fraud or a gross wrong against the foreign court.
The Second Department publicly censured a lawyer who secretly told bankruptcy counsel not to answer a judge’s call and rejected his challenge to stipulated reciprocal discipline.
The Second Department held that J-51 tenants had not proved knowing deregulation fraud on summary judgment, but rejected the landlords’ contractual attorney-fee claim.
The Second Department protected a $3.85 million buyer that reasonably relied on an LLC manager’s apparent authority despite an undisclosed later operating agreement.
The Second Department preserved fraud claims over merchant-cash-advance withdrawals but vacated an injunction because the borrower lacked evidence of likely success and irreparable harm.
The Second Department held that documented reasonable diligence establishes mandatory good cause for a CPLR 306-b extension and that reservice may precede a traverse hearing.
The Third Department held that filing an election validation case is insufficient unless every necessary party is served within the statutory period, which an order to show cause cannot extend.