Background
Michael B. Cosentino represented a Massachusetts health center and its owner in a contract suit. At a pretrial hearing, he told the judge that his clients might default or seek bankruptcy protection. When the judge directed the clerk to telephone the clients’ bankruptcy lawyer from the bench, Cosentino secretly emailed and texted that lawyer: “Don’t pick up.” He inadvertently copied opposing counsel on the email, and the incident was referred to disciplinary authorities.
Cosentino admitted the facts in a negotiated Massachusetts disciplinary proceeding. He stipulated that the messages disrupted the tribunal and interfered with the judge’s attempt to conduct the hearing, waived an evidentiary hearing, and accepted a public reprimand. Massachusetts also considered an earlier private admonition concerning law-firm accounting. Cosentino did not report the public reprimand to New York as required.
The Second Department commenced a reciprocal-discipline proceeding under 22 NYCRR 1240.13. Cosentino suggested that he had not received investigative materials or an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, despite his counseled stipulation and waiver. He asked New York to impose no additional sanction because he believed the Massachusetts process had already punished him sufficiently.
Reciprocal discipline is not a second trial of facts voluntarily admitted elsewhere. New York permits defined defenses, but dissatisfaction with a settlement does not recreate waived evidentiary rights. Lawyers considering a disciplinary stipulation should evaluate collateral consequences in every jurisdiction where they are admitted before signing. They should also calendar every resulting notice obligation rather than assume the originating regulator will notify other bars.
The court’s sanction analysis promotes consistency while retaining New York authority over its own bar. It did not mechanically import Massachusetts terminology; it selected the New York sanction corresponding to a public reprimand. That approach gives meaningful weight to the originating jurisdiction without surrendering local disciplinary judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Department imposed reciprocal discipline and publicly censured Cosentino. His due-process suggestion could not overcome the record showing notice, participation with counsel, admissions, and an express waiver of a hearing. He did not establish any recognized defense to reciprocal discipline, such as a fundamental procedural defect, insufficient proof, or conduct that would not constitute misconduct in New York.
The court accorded substantial weight to Massachusetts’s sanction because the misconduct occurred there and that jurisdiction had the strongest interest in evaluating it. Where a foreign sanction is consistent with New York treatment of comparable conduct, the Second Department ordinarily selects the same practical level of discipline. A New York public censure corresponded to Massachusetts’s public reprimand.
The decision also treats the conduct as more than discourtesy. Secretly attempting to prevent a lawyer from answering a judge’s call interfered directly with a tribunal’s operation and reflected adversely on professional fitness. Cosentino’s failure to notify New York of the discipline added a compliance lapse, although the reciprocal sanction rested on the admitted underlying misconduct.
Key Takeaways
- A lawyer who knowingly interferes with a judge’s effort to obtain information risks discipline for disrupting the tribunal and prejudicing justice.
- A counseled stipulation and hearing waiver make a later due-process objection difficult to sustain in reciprocal proceedings.
- New York lawyers disciplined elsewhere must promptly comply with the reporting duties in 22 NYCRR 1240.13.
Why It Matters
For New York firms with multistate practices, the opinion underscores that discipline does not remain confined to the jurisdiction where conduct occurred. Reporting duties should be built into firm compliance systems, and lawyers should obtain ethics advice immediately when another regulator issues any public sanction.
The underlying lesson is basic but consequential: counsel may advocate against an inquiry on the record, seek a conference, or preserve an objection, but cannot covertly obstruct the court’s communication. Electronic messages sent during a proceeding are discoverable evidence, and an accidental copy can turn an impulsive instruction into an admitted disciplinary record.
The decision also underscores a recurring New York appellate lesson: statutory text, the procedural posture, and a carefully developed record work together. Practitioners should preserve the facts that connect the governing rule to the requested remedy rather than rely on labels or broad policy assertions.