Background
Jason Hubbell was convicted of murdering Sharon Myers, who disappeared from her Columbus workplace in May 1997 and was later found strangled near Teal Marsh at the Atterbury Wildlife Preserve. Witnesses had described a roughly six-foot-tall blond man and a white cargo van near Myers before she vanished. Hubbell had brown hair and owned a white minivan with side windows. No DNA from Myers was found in his vehicle or home, pubic-hair DNA recovered near her body did not match him, and the fiber and grass evidence used at trial involved common materials. The prosecution also presented testimony from a jail inmate who claimed Hubbell confessed, although the inmate’s mother questioned his credibility and said he had been paid.
Only months after Myers disappeared, Kelly Eckart was abducted and murdered in strikingly similar circumstances. Both victims were strangled with their own clothing, both had their shoes removed, and their bodies were found about two miles apart near Teal Marsh. Michael Dean Overstreet, a six-foot-tall blond man with access to a white cargo van, was later convicted of raping and murdering Eckart. Franklin investigators developed substantial information connecting Overstreet to Myers as well: his then-wife said he used the cargo van on the day Myers vanished, returned disheveled and covered in blood, and obsessed over news coverage; other witnesses described a possible relationship between Overstreet and a Columbus woman named Sharon.
Franklin officers relayed that information to Columbus investigators, but it was not disclosed to Hubbell despite his request for witness statements and evidence favorable to the defense. Hubbell’s trial lawyer considered Overstreet as an alternate suspect but abandoned that theory based on the incomplete disclosures. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found a violation of Brady v. Maryland—the constitutional rule requiring the prosecution to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused—and ordered a new trial. The State appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge Mathias concluded that the undisclosed material was favorable to Hubbell, had been suppressed by the State, and was material when considered cumulatively against the entire trial record. Materiality did not require Hubbell to prove that acquittal was more likely than conviction. It required a reasonable probability of a different result—enough to undermine confidence in the verdict.
The court rejected the State’s effort to exclude suppressed witness statements from the materiality analysis merely because some might have faced hearsay objections at trial. Brady materiality is not itself an admissibility test. Information can matter because it leads counsel to admissible evidence, supplies impeachment, changes investigation and preparation, or reshapes trial strategy. Here, evidence that officers disregarded or removed information about Overstreet could have impeached the investigation, while direct observations from Overstreet’s wife and the unusual similarities between the murders could have supported the alternate-suspect defense.
Viewed as a whole, the suppressed evidence placed the case in a materially different light. It aligned with witness descriptions of the man and vehicle, supported Hubbell’s theory that another man connected to Myers’s pregnancy had killed her, and would have allowed counsel to investigate and present Overstreet as a developed alternative. The majority also regarded the properly admitted evidence against Hubbell as not strong. Judge Kenworthy concurred in the result but would not characterize that evidence’s relative strength; she found materiality because the defense lacked information necessary to investigate, formulate strategy, and present a full defense. The court did not decide Hubbell’s alternative grounds on cross-appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Indiana courts evaluate suppressed evidence cumulatively and in the context of the complete record, not item by item or under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test.
- Potential inadmissibility does not automatically defeat a Brady claim; suppressed information may be material through investigation, impeachment, trial preparation, or its ability to lead to admissible proof.
- Alternate-suspect evidence is especially significant when it matches the defense theory and exposes weaknesses or omissions in the State’s investigation.
- A new trial does not determine innocence or predict the next verdict; it restores the defendant’s opportunity to present a defense using information that should have been disclosed before the first trial.
Why It Matters
State v. Hubbell is a significant Indiana application of Brady to information spread across cooperating law-enforcement agencies. Prosecutors and investigators cannot evaluate disclosure obligations only by asking what was placed in the lead agency’s formal file. When one department passes credible exculpatory leads to another, the defense is entitled to material information in the prosecution team’s possession, including evidence that may expose tunnel vision or enable a meaningful alternate-suspect investigation.
For Indiana defense lawyers, the opinion supports demanding the full investigative trail and explaining materiality in practical terms: what counsel would have investigated, which witnesses could have been impeached, and how the theory of defense would have changed. For prosecutors, it counsels early collection and review of interagency communications and cautions against treating hearsay or uncertain trial admissibility as a reason to withhold favorable leads. The constitutional question is whether nondisclosure deprived the accused of a fair, confidence-worthy verdict.