Background
Steven Blanc spent 20 days in custody on weapons charges, posted a bond, and was released. After the surety withdrew about a month later, Blanc returned to custody for another 60 days before prosecutors filed a certificate of compliance and statement of readiness.
Through a habeas corpus petition, Blanc argued that CPL 30.30(2)(a) required release because more than 90 calendar days elapsed between his initial commitment and prosecutorial readiness. The prosecution argued that his time at liberty should not count and initially suggested recommitment started a new clock.
Unlike CPL 30.30(1), which can require dismissal for prosecutorial delay, subdivision (2) supplies heightened release protection to defendants held in pretrial custody.
The procedural posture matters because the appellate ruling resolves the governing legal question without necessarily ending every factual or remedial issue. On remand or in related proceedings, the parties must apply the rule to admissible evidence and preserve any issues the panel did not reach.
The opinion also illustrates the value of a statute-specific record. New York appellate courts distinguish closely related doctrines and remedies, so contracts, agency submissions, hearing proof, and sworn factual assertions should address the exact elements at issue rather than rely on broad labels.
Practitioners should identify what the court conclusively decided and what remains open. That distinction can guide discovery, motion practice, settlement, compliance, and transaction planning after the appeal.
The Court’s Holding
In an issue of first impression for the Second Department, the court held that only days actually spent incarcerated on the relevant charges count toward CPL 30.30(2)(a)'s 90-day readiness period. The clock pauses while a defendant is released on bail.
The clock does not reset when the defendant returns to custody. Instead, courts aggregate the separate periods of incarceration. That construction follows the statutory language and the Legislature's goal of preventing prolonged pretrial detention rather than extending the custody remedy to time at liberty.
Blanc accumulated 20 chargeable days before release and 60 after recommitment, for a total of 80. Because prosecutors declared readiness before 90 custody days elapsed, the court dismissed the writ.
Key Takeaways
- CPL 30.30(2)(a)'s felony custody clock counts actual incarceration, not every calendar day after initial commitment.
- Release pauses the clock; recommitment resumes rather than resets it.
- Counsel should maintain a custody-period ledger distinct from the CPL 30.30(1) dismissal calculation.
Why It Matters
The opinion resolves a recurring bail and speedy-trial calculation for defendants who leave and later return to custody. Defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges now have a clear aggregation rule in the Second Department.
The distinction can be outcome-determinative: a case may accumulate substantial prosecution delay for dismissal purposes while remaining below the custody threshold for mandatory release. Motion papers should identify the legal remedy sought and calculate each statutory clock independently.
The decision also underscores a recurring New York appellate lesson: statutory text, the procedural posture, and a carefully developed record work together. Practitioners should preserve the facts that connect the governing rule to the requested remedy rather than rely on labels or broad policy assertions.