Second Department partially reverses in Child Victims Act case: foster care agency’s negligence and Social Services Law § 413 reporting claims survive summary judgment, but punitive damages are dismissed and school district escapes liability for acts of an agency-employed abuser.
Second Department reverses and dismisses hostile work environment and religious discrimination claims against faculty union (PSC) and its president, holding that unions have no affirmative duty to prevent workplace harassment because they do not control the employer’s work environment.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed MCRA and defamation verdicts against neighboring property owners who mounted a campaign of threats and false statements against a cannabis retailer’s permit and property rights, holding that the absolute litigation privilege did not shield demands and defamatory statements made in private meetings and community settings unrelated to the defendants’ pending Land Court lawsuits. The civil conspiracy judgment was reversed because the underlying “extortion” theory was tied to a c. 93A claim on which the defendants had prevailed; extortion is not a freestanding civil tort in Massachusetts. The $178,743.25 MCRA attorney’s fee award was affirmed as timely and reasonable; fee petitions under civil rights statutes are not subject to the Rule 59(e) deadline and need not be proportionate to damages.
Second Department modifies ASA ruling against Goodyear: post-18 IIED and negligence claims dismissed on respondeat superior and WCL exclusivity grounds, but NY Human Rights Law hostile work environment claim survives.
The Third Department reverses and holds that a police officer who suffered psychological trauma from a station-house shooting is a “crime victim” under New York’s Son of Sam Law without needing to show physical injury, broadly construing Executive Law § 632-a.
The Fourth Department bars a state premises-liability claim arising from hepatitis A contraction in Erie County jail under collateral estoppel, based on the federal court’s explicit finding that the plaintiff produced no evidence of unsanitary conditions, and dismisses punitive damages against the municipality.
The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a grandparent visitation order entered after the mother was forced to proceed pro se, holding Family Court violated her statutory right to counsel under Family Court Act § 262 by relieving her second assigned attorney without finding forfeiture based on egregious conduct.
The Appellate Division, Third Department held that the State Police must individually review and justify each redaction in its officer misconduct spreadsheet rather than applying a blanket personal-privacy exemption, while upholding FOIL counsel fee awards for the agency’s unreasonable denial.
The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a dismissal and reinstated a class action challenging the NYPD’s practice of routinely handcuffing all arrestees during arraignment without judicial approval, finding the policy states a viable due process claim under the New York State Constitution.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms summary judgment dismissing race discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL brought by a former MetroPlus executive whose employment was terminated following a state Medicaid audit, finding defendants provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that plaintiff failed to show was pretextual.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms leave to amend a Child Victims Act complaint to correct an incorrectly listed address for a defendant Roman Catholic church, rejecting appellants’ argument that the amendment introduces a new defendant after the CVA revival window closed.
A claimant who filed within the Adult Survivors Act’s revival window cannot amend after that window closes to add entirely new incidents of sexual abuse beyond those pleaded in the original claim, even if the proposed incidents involve the same parties or the same correctional facilities.
The First Department dismissed gender-motivated violence and intimate-recording claims in a divorce action, holding that the NYC Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act requires allegations of gender-based animus beyond possessive or jealous conduct, and that both NYC Administrative Code § 10-180 and Civil Rights Law § 52-b apply only to visual depictions — not audio recordings.
The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirms dismissal of an Executive Law § 296(16) discrimination claim by a nurse practitioner with a sealed felony conviction, holding that the statute’s enumerated list of protected criminal dispositions does not include a general felony conviction — leaving a gap that only legislative action can close.
A divided North Carolina Court of Appeals held on remand that a private medical society that administered a COVID-19 vaccine to a fourteen-year-old over his objection and without parental consent was sufficiently alleged to be a state actor for a Corum constitutional claim, and that the PREP Act’s complete bar on tort remedies itself satisfies the “no adequate state remedy” element required to bring a direct claim under the North Carolina Constitution.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a denial of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, holding that a former hospital concierge’s NYSHRL disability discrimination and retaliation claims failed because the complaint contained only conclusory allegations about his disability and did not plead facts showing he could perform in-person patient-contact work with a reasonable accommodation.
On remand from the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims arising from an unconsented COVID-19 vaccination administered to a minor at a school-based clinic may proceed: the private medical non-profit operating the clinic was adequately alleged to be a state actor under a joint-engagement theory, and the PREP Act’s immunity over tort claims leaves no adequate state remedy, satisfying all elements of a Corum claim.
The First Department affirmed denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney under RPC Rule 1.18 (prospective client rule), holding that plaintiff did not meet the ‘heavy burden’ of showing the current representation was ‘substantially related’ to the prior consultation, and that plaintiff waived attorney-client privilege over consultation emails by filing them publicly on the court docket.
The Appellate Division, Second Department holds that a former seminarian’s race, sexual orientation, and disability discrimination claims against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and Cardinal Dolan are non-justiciable under the First Amendment’s ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, because adjudicating them would require the court to evaluate his progress in Catholic priestly “human formation” — an inquiry into religious doctrine the courts may not conduct.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms denial of class certification for Asian NYPD captains alleging race discrimination in discretionary promotions to Deputy Inspector, holding that conclusory assertions of seeking “widespread, systematic reform” are insufficient to satisfy CPLR 901(a)(5)’s superiority requirement.
The First Department upheld denial of accidental disability retirement to an NYPD officer with PTSD from witnessing a fellow officer stabbed through the eye, holding that confronting on-duty violence falls within the inherent risks of police work and is not an ‘accident’ for pension purposes.
The First Department reversed reinstatement of a sexual harassment claim against a condo board whose president allegedly harassed his personal assistant, holding that NYCHRL employer liability requires an employment relationship—agency alone is insufficient.
The First Department reinstated a detective’s NYCHRL/NYSHRL retaliation claims after he objected to a supervisor’s national-origin remark and his gun and shield were confiscated days later, while affirming dismissal of his Civil Service Law §75-b and discrimination claims.
First Department mostly denies dismissal of disability discrimination claims against state Assembly member as employer, but strikes aiding-and-abetting counts where he was the sole alleged discriminator.