People v. Shawn A. — Early DVSJA resentencing dismissal cannot be appealed
The Third Department held that a without-prejudice dismissal at the first stage of a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act resentencing request is not appealable.
The Third Department held that a without-prejudice dismissal at the first stage of a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act resentencing request is not appealable.
The First Department exercised interest-of-justice discretion to send a 17-year-old’s weapon case to Family Court because prosecutors had not shown extraordinary circumstances overcoming Raise the Age’s removal presumption.
The Second Department held that release on bail pauses CPL 30.30(2)(a)’s 90-day custody clock and that later recommitment resumes, rather than resets, the count.
The Second Department upheld Suffolk County’s DWI vehicle-forfeiture law and found forfeiture of a $21,000 Nissan proportionate to a repeat felony DWI involving extreme speeding.
The Third Department reinstated grandparent-visitation petitions and ordered immediate contact where Family Court failed to weigh each child’s best interests and less restrictive safeguards.
The Massachusetts SJC preserved an injunction against Quincy’s saint statues and reaffirmed the state-specific Article 3 framework for government religious displays.
The Supreme Court held that the pleaded facts were sufficient to proceed on a narrow constitutional theory: a school board may not be deliberately indifferent to extreme in-school conduct that deprives a student of equal access to a sound basic education. The Court also found immediate appellate jurisdiction based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts, reversed the contrary ruling, and remanded.
The First Department ordered a second resentencing because the judge denying youthful-offender treatment appeared unfamiliar with the defendant’s actual offense and personal circumstances.
The Court of Appeals allowed review but rejected the merits challenges. Viewed in the State’s favor, the evidence supported the obstruction charges and the theory submitted to the jury. The indictments alleged facts supporting the essential elements. Under recent North Carolina Supreme Court precedent, an asserted omission concerning factual detail did not automatically create a jurisdictional defect; Lindsay also fa
The Third Department upheld PERB’s finding that a village manager could add a supervisor to an existing union and that a successor board committed an improper practice by cutting his pay to force withdrawal.
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the State need not indemnify a former correctional officer whose noncooperation deprived it of an opportunity to defend.
The Fourth Department reinstated battery and Human Rights Law claims, holding that consent, physical helplessness, and management participation presented fact questions.
The Third Department held that DOCCS must honor a sentencing judge’s shock-incarceration order when the same judge imposes a concurrent sentence for a non-disqualifying offense.
Second Department partially reverses in Child Victims Act case: foster care agency’s negligence and Social Services Law § 413 reporting claims survive summary judgment, but punitive damages are dismissed and school district escapes liability for acts of an agency-employed abuser.
Second Department reverses and dismisses hostile work environment and religious discrimination claims against faculty union (PSC) and its president, holding that unions have no affirmative duty to prevent workplace harassment because they do not control the employer’s work environment.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed MCRA and defamation verdicts against neighboring property owners who mounted a campaign of threats and false statements against a cannabis retailer’s permit and property rights, holding that the absolute litigation privilege did not shield demands and defamatory statements made in private meetings and community settings unrelated to the defendants’ pending Land Court lawsuits. The civil conspiracy judgment was reversed because the underlying “extortion” theory was tied to a c. 93A claim on which the defendants had prevailed; extortion is not a freestanding civil tort in Massachusetts. The $178,743.25 MCRA attorney’s fee award was affirmed as timely and reasonable; fee petitions under civil rights statutes are not subject to the Rule 59(e) deadline and need not be proportionate to damages.
Second Department modifies ASA ruling against Goodyear: post-18 IIED and negligence claims dismissed on respondeat superior and WCL exclusivity grounds, but NY Human Rights Law hostile work environment claim survives.
The Third Department reverses and holds that a police officer who suffered psychological trauma from a station-house shooting is a “crime victim” under New York’s Son of Sam Law without needing to show physical injury, broadly construing Executive Law § 632-a.
The Fourth Department bars a state premises-liability claim arising from hepatitis A contraction in Erie County jail under collateral estoppel, based on the federal court’s explicit finding that the plaintiff produced no evidence of unsanitary conditions, and dismisses punitive damages against the municipality.
The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a grandparent visitation order entered after the mother was forced to proceed pro se, holding Family Court violated her statutory right to counsel under Family Court Act § 262 by relieving her second assigned attorney without finding forfeiture based on egregious conduct.
The Appellate Division, Third Department held that the State Police must individually review and justify each redaction in its officer misconduct spreadsheet rather than applying a blanket personal-privacy exemption, while upholding FOIL counsel fee awards for the agency’s unreasonable denial.
The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a dismissal and reinstated a class action challenging the NYPD’s practice of routinely handcuffing all arrestees during arraignment without judicial approval, finding the policy states a viable due process claim under the New York State Constitution.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms summary judgment dismissing race discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL brought by a former MetroPlus executive whose employment was terminated following a state Medicaid audit, finding defendants provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that plaintiff failed to show was pretextual.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms leave to amend a Child Victims Act complaint to correct an incorrectly listed address for a defendant Roman Catholic church, rejecting appellants’ argument that the amendment introduces a new defendant after the CVA revival window closed.