Background
Eight individual plaintiffs, led by Amgad Mukhtar, brought suit in Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of numerous Massachusetts firearm licensing statutes and related laws. Their targets were sweeping: they contested restrictions on carrying firearms in schools, municipal buildings, and other locations, as well as the $100 licensing fee imposed under G.L. c. 140, § 121F(o)(i). The defendants included Governor Maura Healey, Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell, the Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police, and several other state officials, all sued in their official (and in some cases individual) capacities.
The Superior Court judge dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The plaintiffs alleged that they “would bear arms” in various prohibited locations “were it not for” the challenged statutes, but the complaint contained no concrete factual averments — no specific plans, no identified institutions, and no explanation of why they wished to visit particular places while armed. The only claim on which the plaintiffs could demonstrate a concrete injury was the licensing fee: all plaintiffs except Katalin Egri held firearms licenses and had actually paid the $100 fee.
On appeal, the plaintiffs pressed all of their claims and also argued that the motion judge committed procedural errors and improperly denied leave to amend their complaint.
The Court’s Holding
In a summary decision under Rule 23.0, a panel of the Appeals Court (Shin, Ditkoff, and Tan, JJ.) affirmed the dismissal on all counts. The court conducted de novo review and addressed two central issues: standing and the merits of the licensing-fee challenge.
On standing, the panel held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were fatally conclusory. Under Massachusetts standing doctrine — which requires a party to “allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious action has occurred” — vague assertions that one “would” engage in prohibited conduct are not enough. The court invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), observing that “‘some day’ intentions — without any description of concrete plans” — cannot establish actual or imminent injury. The panel distinguished the plaintiffs’ reliance on Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), because there the petitioners had pleaded specific future statements backed by examples of substantially similar past conduct.
On the licensing fee — the sole claim for which standing existed — the court held that binding Supreme Judicial Court precedent in Commonwealth v. Marquis, 495 Mass. 434, 458-459 (2025), cert. denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 520 (2026), foreclosed relief. Marquis upheld firearm licensing schemes with reasonable processing delays and fees as consistent with the Second Amendment, a conclusion aligned with the U.S. Supreme Court’s dicta in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n.9 (2022). The plaintiffs’ equal protection argument — that fee exemptions for government officials, gunsmiths, and elderly persons require strict scrutiny — also failed, because under Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 (2022), strict scrutiny applies only where state action “significantly interferes” with a fundamental right, and a $100 fee does not meet that threshold.
Key Takeaways
- Conclusory standing allegations doom broad constitutional challenges. Massachusetts courts will not allow plaintiffs to “manufacture standing by ipse dixit.” Boilerplate claims that one would engage in prohibited conduct, without concrete plans or factual detail, are insufficient even in the pre-enforcement context.
- Marquis controls on firearms licensing fees. The SJC’s 2025 decision in Commonwealth v. Marquis — now cert-denied — is binding authority that reasonable licensing fees are constitutional under the Second Amendment. The Appeals Court found no basis to distinguish between fees for resident and nonresident applicants.
- Equal protection claims involving fundamental rights still require a “significant interference” showing. Under Commonwealth v. Roman, the mere fact that a fundamental right is implicated does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny. A $100 licensing fee, even with exemptions for certain groups, does not significantly interfere with the right to bear arms.
- Motions to amend must describe proposed amendments with specificity. Asking the court to identify how a complaint should be amended, without attaching a proposed complaint or describing the amendment in detail, will not survive review for abuse of discretion.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the post-Bruen landscape in Massachusetts: even after the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling expanding Second Amendment protections, the Commonwealth’s firearms licensing framework — including its fee structure — remains on solid constitutional ground. For practitioners advising clients on Second Amendment challenges, Mukhtar makes clear that the Appeals Court will rigorously police standing at the threshold. Sweeping, kitchen-sink complaints challenging multiple statutory provisions will not survive a motion to dismiss unless each claim is backed by particularized, concrete factual allegations of injury.
For the Massachusetts litigation bar more broadly, the decision is a useful reminder that standing doctrine retains real teeth. The panel’s pointed observation that allowing plaintiffs without a concrete stake to litigate these questions is “hardly fair to the future plaintiff with potentially an actual need” signals the court’s concern about advisory opinions and abstract constitutional litigation. Litigators bringing pre-enforcement challenges in any area should take note: plead specific facts or face dismissal.