Background
Mohamad Alsyrawan is a dependent adult who requires extensive assistance with personal care, medical appointments, household activities, and supervision. His mother and sister, who emigrated with him from Syria and are practicing Muslims, serve as his primary caregivers. Pennsylvania’s Department of Human Services approved 133 weekly hours of companion and in-home community-support services through a waiver program, but its “40/60 Rule” generally limits the number of paid hours that relatives may provide.
Alsyrawan maintained that care from an unrelated woman would conflict with sincerely held Islamic requirements governing physical contact and intimate care. He therefore sought an exception that would allow his relatives to provide the covered hours. An administrative hearing officer and the Department’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals rejected his challenge. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, reasoning that the policy did not substantially burden religion because Alsyrawan could receive services from an unrelated male and the rule limited payment to relatives rather than denying services altogether.
The appeal presented claims under both the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, commonly called RFPA. RFPA expressly requires a claimant to establish a “substantial burden” before the government must satisfy strict scrutiny. The dispute was whether courts may import that same threshold into the separate federal constitutional analysis.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Justice Daniel McCaffery’s majority held that a First Amendment claimant need not show that a burden on religious exercise is substantial. The United States Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise cases ask first whether government action burdens sincere religious practice. In the public-benefits setting, that threshold is met when the government puts a person to a forced choice between receiving an otherwise available benefit and following religious beliefs.
The degree of burden and the level of judicial scrutiny are separate questions. If a policy burdening religion is neutral and generally applicable, it ordinarily receives rational-basis review under Employment Division v. Smith. If it is not neutral or generally applicable, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny by showing a compelling interest pursued through narrow means. Requiring a substantial burden at the threshold improperly collapses those steps and carries RFPA’s statutory language into a constitutional test that does not contain it.
The Court did not decide whether Alsyrawan ultimately wins his Free Exercise claim. It sent the case back for the Commonwealth Court to determine whether the 40/60 Rule forced the relevant choice and then apply the appropriate scrutiny. The separate opinions disagreed about whether the existing record already established a burden and whether the Court should resolve neutrality, general applicability, and RFPA without another remand.
Key Takeaways
- A First Amendment Free Exercise claimant in Pennsylvania need not prove a “substantial” burden as an initial constitutional requirement.
- A public-benefits policy burdens religion when it forces a claimant to choose between the benefit and compliance with sincere religious beliefs.
- RFPA remains distinct: its text expressly requires a substantial burden before strict scrutiny applies.
- Neutrality and general applicability determine the level of constitutional scrutiny after the claimant establishes a burden.
Why It Matters
Alsyrawan changes the analytical sequence for Pennsylvania agencies, administrative tribunals, and reviewing courts. A decision-maker cannot dispose of a federal Free Exercise claim merely by labeling the religious consequence insufficiently substantial. The first question is whether the policy imposes a genuine forced choice; the separate neutrality and general-applicability inquiry then determines the government’s burden of justification.
For benefits and regulatory practitioners, the opinion makes claim framing critical. Plead and brief the federal constitutional and Pennsylvania RFPA theories separately, develop evidence concerning the claimant’s actual choices, and identify secular comparators or discretionary exceptions bearing on general applicability. Agencies should likewise build records explaining the policy’s operation and available accommodations rather than relying on the absence of a substantial burden as a universal answer.
The remand also keeps the ultimate merits open. Counsel should not equate proof of any burden with automatic strict scrutiny or victory. The next stage requires close attention to how DHS treats comparable nonreligious requests, whether officials retain individualized discretion, and what interests support the family-caregiver limits. Those facts will determine whether rational-basis review or strict scrutiny governs and whether the policy survives.
The decision therefore supplies a rule for adjudication, not a benefits award.