Background
The Massachusetts Appeals Court has issued its first interpretation of the coercive-control provision that the Legislature added to the Abuse Prevention Act, General Laws chapter 209A, in 2024. The amendment expanded the statutory definition of abuse beyond physical harm, fear of imminent serious physical harm, and compelled sexual relations. It now reaches a pattern intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce, or compel compliance when that pattern causes a family or household member reasonably to fear physical harm or to experience a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.
The parties, identified by pseudonyms, had been married for seventeen years and were in divorce proceedings. A Probate and Family Court judge had awarded the plaintiff sole use of the marital home, but the defendant continued to appear there, enter without permission, and circle the property. The plaintiff testified that he appeared unexpectedly at school, sporting events, a New York movie theater, a vacation rental, and a hotel. On one unauthorized entry, he photographed a calendar showing her whereabouts. He also pressed her to abandon the divorce and told her he was never leaving. The plaintiff said the repeated appearances left her looking over her shoulder and concerned that he was tracking her.
A District Court judge entered an ex parte order and, after a hearing at which both parties testified, extended it for one year. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence did not establish coercive control and that limits on follow-up questioning and cross-examination denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court affirmed. Justice Hand explained that the statute requires proof of a pattern, qualifying conduct and purpose, and a qualifying effect on the protected person. Using the word’s ordinary meaning, the court defined a pattern as a recognizably consistent mode of behavior or series of acts. It declined to decide whether some minimum number of acts is always necessary because the defendant had not briefed that question and the repeated intrusions here readily met the standard.
The defendant’s conduct also fit the statute’s express example of regulating or monitoring another person’s activities, communications, or movements. The trial judge could infer intent from the circumstances: the defendant acquired information about the plaintiff’s plans, repeatedly inserted himself into her life, and used those encounters while demanding that she drop the divorce. Direct evidence of subjective intent was unnecessary. The plaintiff likewise established the required effect. Entering through a window, appearing around the home, blocking her car, and tracking her locations reasonably reduced her sense of physical safety.
The court separately interpreted autonomy to mean the ability to make significant decisions without concern that doing so will expose the person to abuse. Constant monitoring that caused the plaintiff to look over her shoulder and curtailed her independence supported a reduced sense of autonomy. The word reasonably modifies both statutory alternatives, so the perceived loss of safety or autonomy must be objectively reasonable. The defendant’s disregard of the exclusive-occupancy order and the no-contact order supported that finding. The court assumed without deciding that autonomy need not be physical and did not decide the statute’s application to speech alone or its constitutionality.
There was no due-process violation. Chapter 209A hearings need not follow ordinary evidentiary rules so long as the procedure remains fair. Photographs introduced during the self-represented plaintiff’s summation illustrated testimony that defense counsel had already extensively tested. The judge could prevent repetitive questioning, and the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and challenge the allegations.
Key Takeaways
- Coercive control under chapter 209A can be proved without physical violence or an express threat when a consistent course of monitoring or intrusion is intended to compel compliance and reasonably diminishes safety or autonomy.
- A judge may infer coercive intent from conduct and context. Direct admissions about the defendant’s purpose are not required.
- Autonomy means practical self-determination: the ability to make significant decisions without fearing that the choice will expose the person to abuse.
- Existing orders, repeated unauthorized appearances, and the parties’ expected future contact may bear on whether the plaintiff’s reduced sense of safety or autonomy is objectively reasonable.
Why It Matters
This is the Appeals Court’s first application of Massachusetts’s new coercive-control framework, giving District Court and Probate and Family Court practitioners a concrete roadmap for proof. A strong record should organize evidence by repeated acts, the conduct being monitored or controlled, the inference of purpose, and the effect on safety or decision-making. Calendars, doorbell-camera images, location evidence, prior orders, and testimony connecting conduct to demands may be especially important.
The decision also marks its boundaries. It does not prescribe a minimum number of acts, decide whether autonomy must ever be physical, or resolve constitutional questions involving speech. Those issues remain open. But for conduct-based cases involving surveillance, unwanted presence, or persistent intrusion, Kehlani K. confirms that chapter 209A reaches the cumulative loss of safety and freedom that coercive control is designed to produce.