Background
Shannon Leonard Deasey, a White campus police officer at California State University, San Bernardino, was terminated after he ran a full search in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) on a Black university administrator, Anthony Roberson, who had reported a burglary. Deasey used Roberson's name and birth date to obtain his driver's license and address information for an investigation report, discovering an outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrant from 2005. After confirming the warrant was active, Deasey called Roberson to inform him so he could resolve it before being arrested during a traffic stop. Roberson filed a citizen's complaint, stating he was taken aback that Deasey ran his personal information as though he was a suspect.
The University hired the OIR Group to investigate, which determined Deasey's use of CLETS was not consistent with the database's 'right to know' and 'need to know' philosophy, though it did not sustain allegations of bias-based policing. Despite a Skelly hearing officer's recommendation to revoke the discipline—finding Deasey had both a right and need to know—the University terminated him in August 2021 for unprofessional conduct and failure to perform duties under Education Code section 89535. Deasey appealed to the State Personnel Board (SPB), which found no CLETS violation and reinstated him with back pay, modifying his dismissal to a letter of reprimand for failing to fully explain to Roberson why he ran the search.
Deasey then sued the Board of Trustees, alleging race discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The superior court granted the University's motion for summary judgment, finding Deasey had not shown discriminatory motive or pretext, and that collateral estoppel did not bar his claim because the issue was not actually litigated before the SPB. Deasey appealed, arguing triable issues of fact remained as to both causes of action.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The court held that the University met its burden of providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Deasey—his unprofessional conduct and violation of Education Code section 89535 based on his interactions with Roberson. The burden then shifted to Deasey to demonstrate this reason was pretextual. While the court acknowledged that the Skelly officer and SPB findings suggested the University's stated reasons were not entirely true, it concluded this evidence alone was insufficient to permit a rational inference that the University's actual motive was discriminatory.
The court rejected Deasey's evidence of pretext, including testimony that Vice President Freer wanted him removed immediately and that the University caved to a threat by Roberson to instigate protests by the Black campus community. The court found these statements did not implicate Deasey's race or lead to an inference that the University acted because Deasey is White. The court also declined to consider testimony about Chief Jamsen's statement regarding the 'optics' of a White officer running a Black director because Deasey failed to reference this evidence in his opposition brief or separate statement of material facts below, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(b)(3).
Regarding the second cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination, the court affirmed summary judgment because Deasey provided no additional argument and the statute does not create a stand-alone tort when no underlying discrimination occurred. The court also agreed with the trial court that collateral estoppel did not bar Deasey's discrimination claim because the University failed to show the issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the SPB appeal.
Key Takeaways
- An employer's stated reason for termination need not be wise or correct, only facially unrelated to prohibited bias and honestly believed.
- Disbelief of an employer's stated reason may suggest a different motivation, but without more, it does not give rise to an inference that the motivation was a prohibited one like race discrimination.
- Evidence that an employer acted to appease a complaining employee or avoid protests does not necessarily show discrimination against the terminated employee's race.
- Parties must specifically reference evidence in their opposition papers and separate statement of material facts; courts may disregard evidence hidden in voluminous records.
- A claim for failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA cannot stand alone if the underlying discrimination claim fails.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar employees face in surviving summary judgment on FEHA discrimination claims when the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Even where an employee can show the employer's stated reasons were not entirely true or that the punishment was excessive, the employee must still provide substantial evidence that discrimination was the real reason. The ruling also underscores the importance of properly preserving evidence in the trial court by specifically citing it in opposition papers and separate statements, as appellate courts will not consider evidence buried in the record.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket