Background
Christine and Clifford Greenberg were married for nearly 23 years before separating in 2020, and Christine petitioned for dissolution of marriage that year. The parties have two children, both now adults; one has special needs and lives full time with Christine. Before trial, a January 31, 2023 stipulation and order sent certain personal property assets—household furnishings, vehicles, boats, and insurance proceeds from an airplane—to binding arbitration, while characterizing and valuing other assets and debts for the ultimate equalization payment.
The case proceeded to trial on the remaining issues, including the value of two community property businesses, permanent spousal support, attorney fees, and termination of marital status. The trial court valued one business at $3.4 million and the other at $488,600. Clifford was the sole shareholder of both technological companies, which provided nearly all the income for the marriage. The court determined for various reasons that the businesses should be awarded to Clifford, with a $1,944,300 payment to Christine for her one-half community property share, plus $10,000 per month in permanent spousal support and $75,000 in attorney fees and costs to Christine's counsel.
At Christine's request, the trial court reserved jurisdiction over the final equalization payment and over terminating marital status. A purported judgment filed May 31, 2024, expressly reserved jurisdiction over the issues in the January 31, 2023 stipulation and over the final equalizing payment. Two weeks later, Clifford filed a notice of appeal from the purported judgment, arguing the court erred in reserving marital status, in awarding him the businesses with a payment he claimed unaffordable, and that the support and fee orders hinged on that disposition.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal held that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of appealability. The purported judgment was not appealable because it did not dissolve the marriage and addressed only certain property issues; several personal property assets remained for binding arbitration, and the final equalization payment was still pending. Resolving 'virtually all' financial issues is not the legal standard, and appellate jurisdiction cannot be created by consent, waiver, or estoppel.
The court also rejected Clifford's argument that the business disposition was appealable as a collateral final order. The collateral order doctrine did not apply because the ruling was not truly distinct and severable from the general subject of the litigation; it was a necessary step toward dividing the entire marital estate. His challenges to the spousal support and attorney fee orders were likewise premature, because they rested solely on a property division that was not yet final.
The court further held that Clifford did not comply with Family Code section 2025's strict procedure for appealing bifurcated issues, which requires a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. It declined to treat the appeal as a writ petition because Clifford has an adequate remedy by appeal from the final judgment, and writ review would not save the parties from future proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, with costs on appeal awarded to respondent Christine M. Greenberg.
Key Takeaways
- A family law judgment that does not dissolve the marriage and leaves property issues unresolved is not appealable, even if virtually all financial issues have been decided.
- The collateral order doctrine does not apply to a trial court's ruling on community property businesses when that ruling is a necessary step toward dividing the entire marital estate.
- A challenge to spousal support and attorney fee orders is premature when it is based solely on a property division that is not yet final.
- Family Code section 2025 allows an interlocutory appeal of a bifurcated issue only if the party obtains a certificate of probable cause from the trial court and meets strict deadlines.
- An appellate court will decline to treat an improper appeal as a writ petition when the appellant has an adequate remedy by appeal from the final judgment.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict application of the one final judgment rule in family law appeals. Parties cannot appeal from a judgment that resolves only some issues while others remain pending, cannot manufacture jurisdiction by consent or by claiming remaining assets are de minimis, and cannot bypass section 2025's certification requirement for bifurcated issues. The court's refusal to convert the appeal into a writ petition underscores that bright-line appealability rules serve courts and litigants better than ad hoc review of intermediate orders.
For practitioners, challenges to property division, spousal support, and attorney fees in a marital dissolution generally must wait until all property issues are resolved and a final judgment is entered. The collateral order doctrine offers no shortcut for community property rulings, and writ review is reserved for unusual circumstances where no adequate remedy exists.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket