Background
In December 2024, the Monroe County school superintendent recommended terminating Dr. Barbarietta Turner-Pugh’s employment as director of student services, citing failure to perform duties satisfactorily, incompetency, insubordination, and other good cause. Pugh timely requested a hearing under the Students First Act (“SFA”), § 16-24C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
Attorney Leston Stallworth notified the superintendent that he represented Pugh and directed that all correspondence be sent to him. However, Pugh was also represented by Christine Hernandez in a separate federal employment-discrimination action against the Board. The Board set the termination hearing for February 7, 2025, after an agreement between Boardman (the superintendent’s counsel) and Stallworth to continue by one day from the original February 6 date. Notice was sent to Stallworth, and Boardman confirmed the February 7 date to Hernandez as well.
Neither Pugh nor any of her attorneys appeared at the hearing. The Board proceeded, found cause for termination, and terminated Pugh. A hearing officer appointed under the SFA reversed the termination on procedural-due-process grounds, concluding that the Board had not adequately ensured Pugh’s attendance.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the hearing officer. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Fridy held that the Board provided constitutionally sufficient notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Board sent the hearing notice to Stallworth—the sole attorney who had filed an appearance in the termination matter—and Stallworth had expressly directed that all correspondence be sent to him. That notice was legally adequate under binding precedent requiring service on the attorney of record.
The court rejected the argument that Hernandez’s scheduling of depositions in the federal case on the same day created a due-process problem. Under § 16-24C-6(b), the Board sets the hearing and may reschedule only “by agreement or for good cause shown.” No motion to continue was ever filed, and the statute did not require Hernandez’s consent. The court emphasized that “[d]ue process requires notice and an opportunity to respond, not guaranteed attendance or actual participation,” citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), and Alabama State Tenure Commission v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 332 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
The court further held that internal communication failures among Pugh’s multiple attorneys could not be imputed to the Board. The Board acted consistently with Stallworth’s written directive and the SFA’s procedural requirements. The hearing officer’s order was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to affirm the Board’s termination decision.
Key Takeaways
- Under the Students First Act, notice of a termination hearing sent to the employee’s attorney of record is constitutionally sufficient—even if the employee has other counsel in related proceedings who may not have received direct notice.
- An employer is not required to investigate or resolve internal communication breakdowns among an employee’s multiple attorneys before proceeding with a scheduled hearing.
- The failure to file a motion to continue—rather than merely informally indicating unavailability—forfeits any scheduling-based due-process objection under the SFA.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the due-process notice requirements for teacher and administrator terminations under Alabama’s Students First Act. For school boards, the opinion provides comfort that notice to the designated attorney of record satisfies constitutional requirements, regardless of whether the employee has retained additional counsel in parallel litigation. For employee-side practitioners, the case is a stark reminder that designating a single point of contact for administrative proceedings carries real consequences—if that attorney fails to communicate internally, the resulting default will not be excused as a due-process violation. The decision also reaffirms that the SFA vests scheduling authority in the employer, and that due process in this context means opportunity, not outcome.