Background
BEG26, a grandmother, applied for administrative assessment of child support for her grandson J in November 2022, which a Child Support Registrar delegate accepted on 5 December 2022. BEH26 (the child’s mother) objected on 7 June 2024—550 days later, far beyond the 28-day objection period under s 81(1) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth). She requested an extension of time to lodge the objection. On 18 September 2024, a delegate purported to grant this extension, and on 28 September 2024, allowed the objection. BEG26 appealed to the Administrative Review Tribunal, which affirmed the delegate’s decision on 9 January 2026. BEG26 then appealed to the Federal Court.
The critical issue was statutory timing. Section 83(1) required the Registrar to decide whether to grant or refuse an extension application within 60 days. Section 83(2) contained a deeming provision: if no decision was made within 60 days, the Registrar was *deemed* to have refused the application. The extension application was lodged on 7 June 2024; the 60-day window expired on 6 August 2024. The delegate’s decision on 18 September 2024 came 43 days after that deadline.
The Court’s Holding
Justice McDonald held that the delegate’s decision to extend time was invalid because it was made outside the statutory 60-day window. The deeming provision in s 83(2) meant that, at the end of 60 days with no decision, the application was deemed refused as a matter of law. After that point, the delegate had no power to reconsider or reverse that deemed refusal. The delegate therefore acted beyond power (ultra vires) when it purported to grant the extension on 18 September 2024.
This jurisdictional error cascaded upward. Section 87(1) allowed a delegate to decide an objection only “[i]f an objection is lodged under” Part VII of the Act. An objection lodged outside the 28-day period is not validly “lodged” unless an extension of time has been validly granted (per s 83(6)). Because no valid extension existed, the objection was never validly lodged, and the delegate had no power to allow it. The Tribunal, which reviews administrative decisions by standing in the decision-maker’s shoes, was legally bound to set aside the objection decision, not proceed to decide its merits. By reviewing the objection on substance rather than recognizing the fatal jurisdictional defect, the Tribunal itself exceeded its powers.
Key Takeaways
- Statutory deadlines in administrative law are not merely procedural courtesies: when legislation prescribes a time limit for a decision and includes a deeming clause (deemed refusal on expiry), the power to decide ceases to exist after the deadline, not merely the obligation to decide.
- Deeming provisions create objective legal consequences: the Registrar’s deemed refusal on 6 August 2024 was final, and the delegate could not unwind it by later making an affirmative decision.
- Tribunals reviewing administrative decisions are bound by the same legal constraints as the original decision-maker; they cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by proceeding to the merits.
- An objection to a child support decision lodged outside the prescribed period has no legal standing unless an extension of time has been validly granted.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that administrative law time limits are substantive, not merely procedural. For child support applicants and objectors in Australia, it clarifies that once a deadline for seeking an extension passes unmet, the application for extension is deemed finally refused and cannot be rescued by a late decision. The judgment also signals that tribunals reviewing administrative decisions must respect jurisdictional boundaries: they cannot ignore defects in a decision-maker’s power and pretend jurisdiction exists by reaching the merits.
The case has broader significance for Australian administrative law. It confirms that where legislation combines a time limit with a deeming provision (treating failure to decide within the time as a deemed refusal), the passing of the deadline extinguishes the power itself, not just the duty. This principle applies across many administrative regimes and limits the discretion of officials and reviewing tribunals to overlook procedural time constraints in the name of reaching a substantive outcome on the merits.