Background
Wolfgang Coen was serving a federal sentence for online grooming and possessing child abuse material. His non-parole period expired on 25 February 2026. Before that date, a delegate of the Attorney-General refused parole under s 19AL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
The Commonwealth Parole Office had provided the delegate with the sentencing remarks, which included matters potentially adverse to Mr Coen. Although the delegate removed several specific references to those remarks from the proposed reasons because they had not been put to Mr Coen, the final refusal notice still said that the parole risk assessment took account of “the comments by the sentencing court.” Mr Coen sought judicial review.
The Court’s Holding
Kennett J set aside the parole refusal under s 16(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Procedural fairness required Mr Coen to receive notice of the particular adverse aspects of the sentencing remarks on which the decision-maker proposed to rely, so that he could respond.
The Court rejected the Attorney-General’s submission that the remaining reference to the sentencing court’s comments was merely loose wording or an editorial oversight. The reasons indicated that those comments had been taken into account adversely, yet Mr Coen had not been told which aspects were said to support that conclusion. The denial was material because he might have made submissions that could have affected the outcome. The Court rejected the other review grounds, including alleged inadequate reasons, failure to consider relevant matters, factual error, misunderstanding of community protection, and legal unreasonableness.
Key Takeaways
- A parole decision-maker who relies adversely on sentencing remarks must identify the relevant adverse matters to the prisoner and allow a meaningful opportunity to respond.
- Removing some undisclosed sentencing material from draft reasons did not cure the problem where the final reasons still relied on unspecified sentencing-court comments.
- The Attorney-General must make a fresh parole decision as soon as practicable; the Court did not order mandamus because the statutory duty was sufficient.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that procedural fairness in federal parole decisions is practical and specific: a prisoner need not merely know that sentencing remarks exist, but must be alerted to the particular adverse use proposed for them.
It also distinguishes reviewable unfairness from disagreement with a parole outcome. Brief reasons and a decision contrary to corrective-services recommendations will not alone establish legal error where the statutory scheme leaves those matters to the decision-maker’s discretion.