Background
Peng Gao, acting without a lawyer, appealed after Moshinsky J dismissed his originating application for judicial review and three interlocutory applications on 30 January 2026. Gao filed an amended notice of appeal and supporting affidavit, contending that Moshinsky J had granted him leave to appeal orally.
Needham J reviewed the transcript. Moshinsky J had told Gao that no consent or leave was needed to appeal that decision; the exchange did not amount to a grant of leave. Needham J said that, to the extent Gao sought to appeal interlocutory decisions, he needed to apply for leave to do so.
The Court’s Holding
The Court made case-management orders rather than deciding the merits of the appeal. Gao was given until 31 July 2026 to file and serve any application for leave to appeal. The respondent was permitted until 3 August 2026 to file a notice objecting to the competency of the appeal.
The respondent’s proposed objection and summary-judgment application will be determined on the papers, with prescribed timetables for evidence and submissions. The Court also required Gao to read the Litigants in Person Practice Note and file its acknowledgement form by 31 July 2026, following concerns about his interruptions during hearings.
Key Takeaways
- An appeal from interlocutory decisions requires leave; an informal request for consent does not establish that leave was granted.
- The Court preserved Gao’s opportunity to seek leave while allowing the respondent to challenge the appeal’s competency.
- Self-represented parties must comply with the Court’s conduct and communication requirements.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the Federal Court’s approach to managing procedurally uncertain appeals brought by self-represented litigants. It separates the question whether an appeal is competent from the unresolved merits of Gao’s underlying judicial-review case.