Background
In November 2025, self-represented litigant Stephen Groom attempted to file originating documents in the Federal Court of Australia’s South Australia Registry seeking relief against the State of South Australia. His proposed claim arose from an intervention order issued by the Adelaide Magistrates Court in October 2011 which he alleged was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction — specifically, that no originating complaint had been sworn or filed. He alleged that enforcement of the void order subjected him to unlawful detention over several years, causing him personal, financial and reputational harm. He sought, among other things, declarations, prerogative writs, and $25 million in damages founded on causes of action including misfeasance in public office, malicious prosecution, breach of statutory duty, and unlawful imprisonment.
A Registrar refused to accept the documents for filing under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which permits refusal where documents are frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Registrar reasoned that the documents invoked the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), which does not apply to the State of South Australia or the Magistrates Court, and that the $25 million damages claim was arbitrary, without substance, and fanciful. Groom then applied for judicial review of that refusal. The Registrar submitted to the outcome and did not participate in the hearing.
Justice Charlesworth heard the matter on 16 March 2026, with final written submissions received on 8 May 2026.
The Court’s Holding
Charlesworth J allowed the application and ordered the documents to be accepted for filing. The Court first confirmed that the Registrar’s power under r 2.26 is administrative rather than judicial in character, rejecting Groom’s primary argument that the refusal constituted an impermissible exercise of judicial power. That power is constitutionally valid so long as a right of review of the Registrar’s decision exists in the Court itself, as it does here.
However, the Court found the Registrar erred by characterising the proposed proceeding as solely an application under the ADJR Act. Fairly construed, the documents disclosed causes of action in misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty, and unlawful detention, supported by Chapter III constitutional arguments drawing on Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 and NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 280 CLR 137. The Court noted that the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction under s 39B(1A)(b) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) extends to matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, and that jurisdiction is not obviously excluded merely because the respondent is a State or the impugned acts are those of a State court. Whether jurisdiction actually exists was a substantive question requiring open-court consideration with full submissions.
On the $25 million damages figure, the Court agreed the quantum appeared arbitrary but held that an arbitrary claimed amount is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to reject documents where the Court may otherwise have jurisdiction. The appropriate mechanism to address an unsupported quantum is an application for particulars or, if warranted, a strike-out application — not a filing refusal at the registry stage. The Court expressly reserved all questions of jurisdiction, abuse of process, and finality for the judge to whom the substantive matter would be allocated, and ordered that the State of South Australia be served with the orders and reasons before or at the time the sealed documents are served.
Key Takeaways
- A Registrar exercising the r 2.26 power must assess all causes of action disclosed on the face of the documents, not only those suggested by the form used; an error in form does not determine the substantive character of a proposed proceeding.
- The ADJR Act’s inapplicability to a proposed proceeding does not automatically doom it if other heads of federal jurisdiction — such as constitutional matters under s 39B(1A)(b) of the Judiciary Act — are arguably engaged.
- An apparently high or arbitrary quantum of damages sought does not independently justify refusal to file documents where the Court may otherwise have jurisdiction; the respondent can seek particulars or a strike-out once the proceeding is on foot.
- The r 2.26 filing-refusal power is administrative, not judicial, and does not offend Chapter III of the Constitution provided that judicial review of a refusal remains available, consistent with Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84.
- An order accepting documents for filing does not preclude a party from subsequently seeking a stay, strike-out, or summary dismissal on any ground, including abuse of process or finality.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the limits of a Federal Court Registrar’s gatekeeping power under r 2.26. Registrars must engage in a substantive analysis of the totality of causes of action pleaded — not merely the procedural form selected by a litigant — before refusing to accept documents as an abuse of process. A mistaken reliance on an inapplicable statutory regime (here, the ADJR Act) while ignoring potentially viable common-law and constitutional claims is itself an error justifying review. The case therefore provides meaningful procedural protection for self-represented litigants whose documents may be imperfectly drafted but whose claims are not obviously beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.
More broadly, the judgment signals that questions about whether a Chapter III constitutional challenge to the conduct of State court officers can found federal jurisdiction under s 39B(1A)(b) of the Judiciary Act are genuinely open and complex, warranting determination by a judge on full argument rather than summary disposal at the filing stage. Practitioners advising clients on the proper forum for constitutional challenges to State court conduct — particularly those involving alleged jurisdictional nullity and consequent unlawful detention — should note that the Federal Court has not closed the door on such claims, even where the respondent is a State.