Background
Rakesh Lal, an overseas-trained respiratory physician, applied to the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (the College) for a specialist assessment in 2014 and was assessed as “substantially comparable” to an Australian-trained physician. On that basis, the Medical Board of Australia granted him limited registration and he commenced employment as a Staff Specialist at Mackay Hospital in October 2017, subject to a 12-month period of practice under peer review.
In July 2018, the College’s overseas-trained practitioners’ subcommittee found his peer review progress unsatisfactory and required him to complete 12 months of “top up” training at an accredited tertiary site followed by a further 12 months under peer review — requirements that Mackay Hospital, not being an accredited tertiary training site, could not accommodate. The Health Service suspended him on full pay and gave him notice it was considering whether his employment had been frustrated by operation of law. He filed an industrial dispute, but in December 2018 settled by deed, agreeing to resign. He then withdrew his pending registration renewal application. Between 2022 and 2023 he made several further registration applications, each of which was either withdrawn by him or deemed withdrawn for non-compliance. His proceedings in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (dismissed October 2022) and the Federal Court (judgment for respondents April 2025, appeal dismissed June 2025) each failed.
In July 2025, Lal — self-represented — filed an originating application in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking judicial review of decisions made by all four respondents spanning the entire period from 2015 to 2025, encompassing his registration, supervision, credentialing, peer review, and eligibility for specialist recognition. He later filed an amended originating application. All four respondents applied under s 48 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) to have the amended application dismissed.
The Court’s Holding
Copley J dismissed the amended originating application against all respondents. The Court found multiple independent grounds warranted dismissal under s 48 of the Judicial Review Act. First, the application was filed well outside the statutory time limits prescribed by ss 26 and 46 of the Act — the originating application was not filed until July 2025, years after the principal decisions challenged, and the applicant provided no adequate justification for an extension of time. Second, as against the College, the Court accepted that the College’s assessment decisions were not decisions “made or required to be made under an enactment” within the meaning of s 4(a) of the Judicial Review Act, because the College is a private public company performing accreditation functions and its comparability determinations do not themselves constitute statutory decisions — the actual registration decisions belong to the Medical Board. Those decisions were therefore not amenable to judicial review at all.
Beyond jurisdictional barriers, the Court found the amended originating application disclosed no reasonable basis for review, was imprecise and unclear in identifying which decisions were challenged, and was both frivolous and vexatious. The present proceeding was the fourth occasion on which the College had been required to respond to proceedings connected with the same subject matter. The Court applied the broad summary dismissal power confirmed in Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell (2020) 5 QR 367, which holds that s 48(1)(a)’s “inappropriate” standard is not confined to cases demonstrating no arguable error — it extends to cases where, even if error existed, the circumstances or subsequent events make it inappropriate to continue the proceeding.
Key Takeaways
- Assessments by specialist medical colleges such as the Royal Australasian College of Physicians are not independently amenable to judicial review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) because they are recommendations made by an accredited private entity, not decisions made under an enactment — registration decisions vest in the Medical Board.
- Queensland’s s 48 summary dismissal power is broad: a court may dismiss a judicial review application not only where no error is shown, but also where — even assuming error — continuation of the proceedings would be inappropriate given the history, delay, or alternative processes available.
- Significant unexplained delay in filing for judicial review, combined with repeated prior proceedings raising the same subject matter, will ordinarily justify summary dismissal without a full merits hearing; applicants must provide adequate justification for any extension of time under ss 26 or 46 of the Act.
- Repeated litigation of the same grievance across multiple tribunals and courts (QCAT, Federal Court, and now the Supreme Court) without new grounds can constitute vexatious and abusive conduct warranting dismissal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the limits of judicial review as a remedy for overseas-trained medical practitioners dissatisfied with specialist assessment outcomes. Because the College’s comparability assessments are made by a private accreditation body — even one performing a function embedded in the national regulatory framework — they do not attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts under the Judicial Review Act in the same way that Medical Board registration decisions do. Practitioners challenging the fairness of such assessments must exhaust the College’s own internal reconsideration and appeals processes, and any further challenge must be directed to the statutory decision-maker (the Medical Board) through appropriate channels and within statutory time limits.
More broadly, the case is a practical illustration of the Queensland courts’ willingness to use s 48’s summary dismissal power early and decisively where judicial review proceedings are out of time, imprecisely pleaded, and represent the latest in a series of unsuccessful challenges to the same regulatory outcomes. Practitioners and litigants should note that delay is not merely a procedural hurdle — combined with a history of prior proceedings, it can itself become an independent basis for dismissal without any examination of the underlying merits.