Background
Janusz Piec, a Polish immigrant who arrived in Australia in 2004, had accumulated a long criminal record primarily involving domestic violence offences. In December 2020, he was convicted of domestic violence–related offences and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. His partner visa was mandatorily cancelled in February 2021 under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Following an appeal, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal revoked the cancellation on 27 April 2022 and reinstated the visa. Thirty-four months later, on 9 March 2025, the Assistant Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs exercised personal power under section 501BA to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and cancel Piec’s visa again. The Assistant Minister did not offer Piec an opportunity to provide updated information or submissions, as permitted by the exclusion of natural justice rules in section 501BA(3).
Piec sought judicial review, contending the decision was legally unreasonable because it relied on materially stale information—primarily a psychological assessment from August 2020 (more than four years old)—without obtaining current evidence, and that the Assistant Minister made an unsupported inference about when Piec had reoffended.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Stewart dismissed the application. The court found that the Assistant Minister’s reliance on the outdated psychological report was not legally unreasonable because the Assistant Minister did not assume Piec’s mental health remained unchanged. Rather, the Assistant Minister acknowledged the possibility of further rehabilitation and substance intervention but concluded that insufficient time had passed to establish that the risk of reoffending was negligible. This reasoning did not cross the threshold into illogicality or irrationality, even though reasonable minds might disagree.
The court distinguished the case from precedents (GRCF, Ba, XPLW, CPDL, and Wachipa) where ministers had made current risk assessments by impermissibly assuming past circumstances persisted. Here, the Assistant Minister’s approach was materially different: he did not assume unchanged circumstances but instead applied a temporal test—that insufficient time had elapsed to demonstrate reduced risk despite the applicant’s potentially improved rehabilitation status.
On the inference issue, the court upheld the Assistant Minister’s conclusion that Piec’s AVO breach conviction in October 2022 occurred after his release into the community in April 2022, not while in immigration detention. Although direct evidence of when the conduct occurred was absent, the pattern of Piec’s prior convictions, the temporal proximity between release and conviction, and the nature of AVO breaches provided a rational basis for the inference.
Key Takeaways
- A decision-maker relying on historical evidence to assess current risk does not act unreasonably merely by failing to obtain updates, if the reasoning does not assume circumstances remain unchanged but instead applies a temporal threshold test
- Inferences about the timing of conduct may be drawn from circumstantial evidence (temporal patterns, prior conduct, incarceration history) without direct proof, provided some rational basis exists
- The exclusion of natural justice rules in section 501BA(3) means the Minister need not provide an opportunity for the applicant to furnish updated information before exercising the cancellation power
- Precedents on stale evidence do not apply uniformly; each case turns on whether the decision-maker impermissibly assumed unchanged circumstances or applied a different reasoning structure
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the bounds of legal unreasonableness in character-based visa cancellation decisions under section 501BA. While courts have increasingly scrutinized reliance on outdated information, this judgment establishes that using historical evidence is not automatically unreasonable if the reasoning process does not assume static circumstances. The decision provides guidance to immigration ministers on how to articulate reasoning that withstands judicial review when working with evidence gaps created by temporal distance—a common practical problem when decisions are made years after earlier tribunal determinations.
The case also reaffirms that inferential reasoning about factual timing can survive challenge even without direct evidence, provided the inference rests on rational foundations. This is significant for migration law, where precise evidentiary records (such as the exact date an offence was committed) may not always be readily available, and decision-makers must draw reasonable conclusions from circumstantial indicators.