Scott v Scott — Full Court refused bid to disqualify judge for apprehended bias

Case
Susan Jane Scott v Helen Elizabeth Scott, David Alexander Scott and SV Partners SA Pty Ltd
Court
Federal Court of Australia (Australia)
Judge
Jane Annabel Darling Needham (Governor-General of Australia, 2024); Samuel Alexander Vandongen (Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus KC MP, 2024)
Date Decided
28 August 2026
Citation
[2026] FCAFC 124
Topics
Recusal, Apprehended Bias, Judicial Impartiality, Civil Procedure

Background

Dr Susan Scott appealed from orders made by the Supreme Court of South Australia. At the commencement of the Full Court hearing, she applied for Needham J, one of the three judges on the appellate panel, to recuse herself. Needham J had previously rejected a separate request that she withdraw from case-managing the appeal.

The renewed application focused on Needham J’s earlier decision that documents lodged by Dr Scott not be accepted for filing. Those documents included an application under r 3.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) concerning an earlier refusal to accept other documents. Dr Scott contended that Needham J had improperly used administrative rather than judicial power and that this gave rise to apprehended bias. Needham J first rejected the recusal application individually; after Dr Scott maintained her objection, the Full Court considered it.

The Court’s Holding

The Full Court dismissed the recusal application. Vandongen and Wheatley JJ each independently concluded that, even assuming in Dr Scott’s favour that Needham J had wrongly refused the documents for filing and had wrongly acted administratively, there was no logical connection between that assumed error and a concern that Needham J would decide the substantive appeal otherwise than on its legal and factual merits.

A fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that Needham J might fail to bring an impartial mind to the appeal merely because she had previously made a decision adverse to Dr Scott. Vandongen J also rejected as unparticularised and unsupported any suggestion of actual bias. Needham J maintained her own conclusion that she should not recuse herself. Costs of the recusal hearing were reserved.

Key Takeaways

  • An adverse or even assumedly erroneous earlier decision does not, without more, establish apprehended bias.
  • A recusal applicant must identify the alleged bias-producing factor, explain its logical connection to a feared departure from merits-based decision-making, and show that the apprehension is reasonable.
  • When recusal is sought against one member of a multi-judge appellate panel, the challenged judge may decide the application first; if the objection is maintained, the full panel must satisfy itself that it retains jurisdiction.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces the demanding logical-connection requirement in apprehended-bias applications. Procedural disagreement with a judge, including an alleged misuse of administrative power, does not justify disqualification unless it provides an objectively reasonable basis to fear that the judge will not decide the case impartially on its merits.

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