Asatur Sargavakian v. Todd Lyons, et al. — Federal court grants in part habeas petition and orders an individualized immigration bond hearing within seven days

Case
Asatur Sargavakian v. Todd Lyons, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Central District of California
Judge
Angela C. C. Viramontes (A majority of the district judges of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 2026)
Date Decided
2026-10-11
Docket No.
5:26-cv-04691
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration detention, habeas corpus, procedural due process, Mathews v. Eldridge, bond hearing, burden of proof, immigration custody
Source
Mirrored from lexcalifornia.com

Background

Asatur Sargavakian, a native and citizen of Russia, applied for admission at the San Ysidro Port of Entry in July 2021 and was released as “DT” and deemed admitted to July 5, 2022. His asylum application remained pending, and removal proceedings began around January 9, 2024. Local law enforcement arrested him on July 16, 2026, for felony receiving stolen property; after his release the following day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement took him into custody. The court stated that he was detained without notice or a hearing and did not have a final removal order.

Sargavakian filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 18, 2026, asserting procedural and substantive due process claims and arguing that immediate release was the appropriate habeas remedy. He requested, among other relief, release and an injunction against re-detention without notice and a constitutionally adequate hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Respondents answered that he appeared entitled to request an initial bond hearing under Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, while also arguing that he had not exhausted available administrative remedies. The parties later submitted supplemental materials concerning the July arrest after the court requested information about its circumstances.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted the petition in part and denied it in part, resolving the case on procedural due process grounds and expressly declining to consider the other claims because relief on that claim provided the most significant relief. It explained that the Fifth Amendment protects noncitizens within the United States regardless of whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. Applying the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge framework, the court assessed Sargavakian’s private liberty interest, the risk of erroneous detention under the existing procedures and the value of added safeguards, and the government’s interests and administrative burdens.

On the private-interest factor, the court emphasized that immigration officials had allowed Sargavakian to remain at liberty for approximately two years while knowing his identity, immigration status, and location. It concluded that the discretionary decision not to detain him created a protected interest in remaining free while his asylum application was processed, and that he relied on that freedom to form the ordinary attachments of daily life. The court nevertheless tempered the weight of this factor because his recent felony arrest could be relevant to dangerousness or flight risk.

The court found a high risk of erroneous deprivation because Sargavakian had received no hearing or other process before losing his liberty. A hearing would let him contest whether he posed a danger or flight risk, whereas detention without that safeguard could continue regardless of a valid governmental interest. It also found the government’s interest in detention without a pre-detention hearing minimal and the burden of immigration custody hearings low, describing such hearings as routine and minimally costly. Balancing the factors, the court held that a prompt post-deprivation hearing addressing the grounds for detention, flight risk, and dangerousness would satisfy due process.

Key Takeaways

  • The court granted the petition in part on the procedural due process claim and did not decide Sargavakian’s remaining claims.
  • The operative order requires an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days, rather than ordering Sargavakian’s immediate release.
  • At that hearing, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Sargavakian is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
  • Respondents must file a notice of compliance within seven days after the bond hearing.
  • The court treated the government’s earlier decision to leave Sargavakian at liberty for nearly two years as important, but gave that consideration less weight because the recent arrest could bear on dangerousness or flight risk.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes a due process entitlement to a prompt, individualized custody hearing from an entitlement to immediate release. Although the petition sought broader relief, the court selected a bond hearing as the remedy and placed a heightened burden on the government to justify continued detention. Its analysis also shows that a recent arrest can weaken, without defeating, the liberty interest arising from a prolonged period of government-acquiesced freedom.

The order was signed by United States Magistrate Judge Angela C. C. Viramontes on October 11, 2026, in the Central District of California. The supplied document contains no separate writing beyond the order itself.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

✉️ Get tomorrow’s cases before your first coffee
Daily Case Law is our free morning digest — the most substantive new decisions, filtered to your jurisdictions and topics, each linking back here for the full analysis.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top