Background
Fernando Murrain began working for SolarCity in California in 2013, transferred to its Utah operation in 2015, and remained there until his employment ended in October 2017. Tesla acquired SolarCity in late 2016. Murrain took FMLA baby-bonding leave from April 11 to June 6, 2016, received a positive evaluation on January 15, 2017, and that month told Tesla his wife had breast cancer and requested leave to care for her. After deadline extensions and clarification of his caretaking duties, his approved CFRA/FMLA leave ran from March 9 through March 24, 2017.
Shortly after Murrain returned, supervisor Ginger Skinner discussed performance concerns and offered him a return to his former supervisor position or discipline if he remained asset control manager; he returned without a written warning or improvement plan. During Tesla’s fall 2017 layoffs, Skinner and senior vice president Fiona Taylor initially recommended retaining Murrain but decided by early October to terminate him, citing performance problems and Murrain’s interactions with coworker Michael Watts. Direct manager Amber Mantooth testified that Murrain performed adequately, that she had not recommended his termination, and that Skinner changed her higher August 2017 rating to a “2.”
Murrain sued Tesla and SolarCity in September 2018 for CFRA and FMLA interference, FEHA and ADA associational discrimination, retaliation under those statutes, and wrongful termination. The dispute was compelled to arbitration, but Murrain withdrew in 2021 after Tesla did not timely pay arbitration fees. Tesla then moved for summary judgment, arguing California protections did not cover his Utah employment, that legitimate performance reasons explained its actions, and that it had not interfered with leave. The trial court granted the motion and denied a new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal first upheld consideration of Tesla’s additional reply evidence because the trial court continued the hearing and allowed Murrain a surreply, giving notice and an opportunity to respond; the court then reviewed summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence liberally and resolving doubts in Murrain’s favor without weighing credibility.
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to the associational-discrimination and retaliation claims, the court found triable issues of pretext. Skinner’s positive evaluation shortly before Murrain requested leave contrasted with the demotion choice presented shortly after he returned; his testimony that she asked whether his family explained his tiredness supplied circumstantial evidence of discrimination; and evidence supported an inference that his workload was increased to encourage his demotion. The court also identified contradictions about when Skinner learned of subordinates’ misconduct, whether Tesla relied on an objective rating or the Watts conflict, and Skinner’s claim that Mantooth supported termination despite Mantooth’s contrary testimony. Skinner’s failure to seek potentially exculpatory information from Murrain further supported pretext, so Tesla was not entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
On interference, the court found no triable issue as to denial of the 2017 leave because Murrain received the requested leave beginning March 9, but his testimony that Skinner contacted him during his 2016 baby-bonding leave and induced an early return created a factual dispute despite paystub and system-access evidence. The separately raised job-restoration theory was not developed in opposition and was forfeited. Because the discrimination, retaliation, and interference claims survived, wrongful termination also survived. The court declined to decide Tesla’s out-of-state FEHA argument because it could not affirm the judgment. It reversed the judgment, vacated summary judgment, directed a new order denying summary judgment as to all causes of action, and awarded Murrain appellate costs.
Key Takeaways
- Conflicting performance ratings, shifting termination explanations, and contradicted manager testimony can collectively create a triable issue of pretext even when an employer offers facially legitimate reasons.
- A supervisor’s comment connecting an employee’s fatigue to family responsibilities may serve as circumstantial evidence in an associational-discrimination case when considered with the remaining evidence.
- Testimony that a supervisor contacted an employee during protected leave and prompted an early return can defeat summary judgment despite documentary evidence concerning pay and workplace system access.
- Additional summary-judgment reply evidence may be considered when the opposing party receives notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond through a continued hearing and surreply.
- An alternative ground that could not affirm the entire judgment did not require the appellate court to resolve Tesla’s proposed FEHA territorial limitation.
Why It Matters
The decision shows that California’s summary-judgment standard requires courts to assess the combined evidentiary picture rather than isolate each inconsistency or accept an employer’s explanation as conclusively established. Positive evaluations before leave, adverse treatment afterward, disputed rating changes, shifting rationales, and an incomplete investigation together permitted a reasonable factfinder to reject Tesla’s poor-performance explanation. The court also distinguished discrimination and retaliation analysis from FMLA and CFRA interference, which does not use McDonnell Douglas burden shifting.
The ruling is a reversal and remand for further proceedings, not a determination that Tesla unlawfully discriminated, retaliated, or interfered with leave. It leaves the underlying claims for resolution under an order denying summary judgment. The court expressly did not rely on challenged portions of the declarations, did not resolve the preserved evidentiary objections, and left Tesla’s out-of-state FEHA argument undecided because it could not produce an affirmance.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket